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Texas compensation law has been expanded and liberalized dramati-
cally in the past few years. Most of the activity has resulted from the legis-
lature's attempts to modernize Texas's version of this country's oldest form
of social insurance. Some of the expansion of the Act's coverage, however,
has been legislated by the courts, despite the fact that compensation law is
a creature born of and nourished by legislative enactments. This survey
year saw even more judicial legislation than in past years, often in spite of
plain, concise, unambiguous legislative directions. This judicial usurpa-
tion is not limited to Texas or to compensation law, but seems to be a
nationwide trend, resulting in a society that has become litigation ori-
ented.' This trend has caused legitimate concern that this nation may be
ruled by a "largely unelected 'imperial judiciary.' "2
Some of this year's judicial rewriting of the Act3 substantially expanded
the breadth and scope of compensation coverage. This expansion, of
course, continues to drive up the already outrageous cost of workers' com-
pensation insurance.'
* B.B.A., LL.B., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski,
Houston, Texas.
1. See Pike, Why Everybody Is Suing Everybody, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec.
4, 1978, at 50-55.
2. Id at 51. A distinguished 50 year member of the Texas Bar, a former president of
the State Bar and the Houston Bar Association as well as numerous other organizations, in
commenting upon the changes he has seen in his 50 years of legal practice has echoed the
same sentiment: "[T]he fact remains the Federal Courts pervade our lives and, as some say,
sincerely and with more than a little justification, we have come perilously close to govern-
ment by the Federal Judiciary." Gresham, The Houston Bar, 1930's & 40's, 16 Hous. LAW.
21(1978).
3. The Sixty-fifth Legislature extensively amended the Act last year but these changes
are not yet reflected in the reported appellate opinions. These amendments are noted and
discussed in Sartwelle, Workers' Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.
291, 293-305 (1978). Southers, The New Workers' Compensation Venue-Run for the Money,
12 TRIAL LAW. F., Jan.-Mar. 1978, at 3, contains an in-depth analysis of the amendment to
the venue statute, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
4. See Pike, supra note 1. In 1976 the costs of workers' compensation insurance was
estimated to be $8 billion. Odlin, The Workers' Compensation Controversy: A Status Report,
5 JOB SAFETY & HEALTH, Apr. 1977, at 16. In 1974 employers, insured or self-insured, were
estimated to have spent $7.8 billion to insure work injuries. This figure was thought to be
over one billion dollars more than the amount spent in 1973. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS 3 (1976).
Some observers, while not disputing the high cost of compensation and other forms of insur-
ance, contend that inordinate insurance company profits are a major reason for high insur-
ance premiums. See Kitchens, The Name of the Game-Numbers, 13 TRIAL LAW. F., Oct.-
Dec. 1978, at 3. For example, Texas Employers' Insurance Association is reported to have
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1. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Course and Scope of Employment
Going to andfrom Work. Injuries received while going to and from work
are not compensable.5 The rationale of this exclusion is partially based
upon the dual requirements of article 8309, section 1,6 which requires
proof that an injury occurred while the employee was engaged in the fur-
therance of the employer's affairs and was of a kind and character that had
to do with and originated7 in the employer's work, business, trade, or pro-
fession.8 Texas is in accord with virtually every other jurisdiction 9 in ex-
reaped "record profits in 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977 with a 231.5 percent increase in surplus
money and an increase of 371.1 percent in assets" between 1968 and 1978. Id
A federal autocratic system of national workers' compensation is presently the gravest
threat to the states' compensation systems. A brief history of federal workers' compensation
bills in the United States Congress is noted in Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 259 (1977).
5. Texas Compensation Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 519 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1974); Shelton v.
Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Bottom, 365
S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963); Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W.
72 (1922); Dishman v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 440 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Viney v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 82 S.W.2d 1088 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, writ ref'd).
6. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967):
The term 'injury sustained in the course of employment,' as used in this Act,
shall...
...include all other injuries of every kind and character having to do with
and originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer re-
ceived by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs
or business of his employer whether upon the employer's premises or else-
where.
7. E.g., Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Texas Gen. Indem.
Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963); Smith v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 129 Tex.
573, 105 S.W.2d 192 (1937); Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 125 Tex. 96, 81 S.W.2d 67
(1935).
Very early in Texas compensation law the Texas Supreme Court confronted the dual
requirements of the statute in Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246
S.W. 72 (1922). The court wrote:
An injury has to do with, and arises out of, the work or business of the
employer, when it results from a risk or hazard which is necessarily or ordina-
rily or reasonably inherent in or incident to the conduct of such work or busi-
ness. As tersely put by the Supreme Court of Iowa: "What the law intends is
to protect the employee against the risk of hazard taken in order to perform
the master's task."
id at 110, 246 S.W. at 73.
8. It is important to note that the Texas Act differs from the majority of compensation
statutes in its definition of injury in the course of employment. Almost all states adopted the
coverage formula of the British Compensation Act, which covers injuries "arising out of and
in the course of employment." I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 6.10 (1978) (emphasis added). The original Texas Compensation Act did not adopt a cov-
erage formula. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 179, at 429. In 1917, however, the legislature
adopted what is now the current definition of injury in the course of employment. 1917 Tex.
Gen. Laws ch. 103, at 292. The Texas coverage formula requires an injury to "originate"
rather than to arise in the employment. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon
1967). This distinction is little recognized by the Texas courts, a fact vividly illustrated by
the supreme court's specific reference to "arising" in Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v.
Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 110, 246 S.W. 72, 73 (1922). While the distinction between arising
and originating is unimportant in the vast majority of cases, there may be subtle nuances
that would make a critical difference in a close case.
9. I A. LARSON, supra note 8, § 15.11.
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cluding to and from work injuries. While this majority rule admits that
the journey between home and factory or office is caused by the employ-
ment, it necessarily places an arbitrary legal line beyond which the Act's
protection does not extend.' ° However, since compensation coverage is
not confined to the actual work nor the exact work hours nor the em-
ployer's premises," a compromise in the going and coming rule has been
devised: the access doctrine. Normally, an employee with fixed hours and
place of employment is covered by compensation while going to and from
work, but only while on the employer's premises. The access doctrine pro-
vides, however, that if an employer has evidenced an intention that a par-
ticular access route or area be used by the employee in going to and from
work, and the route or area is so closely related to the employer's premises
as to be fairly treated as a part of the premises, then injuries occurring on
the route or in the area while going to and from work are compensable. '
2
When a legal line is drawn, cases will occur close to the com P ensable
side of the line,' 3 and demands will be made to extend coverage.' Such a
demand occurred in Weaver v. Standard Fire Insurance Co.'5 and the
Houston court of civil appeals held that the coming and going rule was
subject not only to the established access doctrine exception but the "per-
sonal comfort doctrine" as well. This appears to be the only case in any
United States jurisdiction applying the personal comfort doctrine to a "go-
ing to and from work" parking lot case.' 6
In Weaver, Continental Airlines, the employer, leased one floor of a
Houston suburban highrise office building for its reservation sales opera-
10. The necessity for the legal line drawing is obvious. The simplistic "but for" test of
work connection is probably applied by the vast majority of courts faced with a course of
employment compensation problem although few would admit to such an unsophisticated
legal thought. The ultimate result of applying this test is that all employee accidents become
compensable. For example, an employee would not have been injured in an automobile
accident on the public streets while driving to work, or would not have slipped on a bar of
soap while bathing before getting dressed for work, or would not have tripped while getting
out of bed to take a bath before getting dressed for work, but for the fact that he had to be at
work. Each new injury raises the "but for the employment" work connection question.
Clearly a legal line is necessary even if it must be arbitrary.
11. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967). The categories of cases
illustrating this point are legion, including the personal comfort doctrine, travel cases, travel-
ing salesmen, 24-hour on-call employees, dual purpose trips, deviations, recreational activi-
ties, social activities and a host of others.
12. See Texas Compensation Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 519 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1974); Lum-
berman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922); Dishman v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 440 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Kelty v. Travelers Ins. Co., 391 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref d n.r.e.).
13. See cases cited in note 12 supra. The cited cases all involve facts creating an intel-
lectual controversy among the various trial and appellate judges regarding the necessity of
replacing the legal line in order to compensate the individual worker involved.
14. Numerous examples are cited by Professor Larson in his discussion of the going to
and from work cases. I A. LARSON, supra note 8, §§ 15.12-.54.
15. 567 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
16. See 1A A. LARSON, supra note 8, §§ 21.10-.84.
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tion. 7 The claimant was employed as a reservation sales agent."8 The
building's other floors were occupied by numerous businesses unrelated to
Continental Airlines.' 9 The employee, with her employer's permission,
left work ten minutes early to carry out an admittedly personal errand and
was injured when she slipped and fell in a parking lot behind and adjacent
to but several hundred yards away from the office building.20 At trial the
employee requested that "course of employment" be defined iri terms of
the personal comfort doctrine. 2' The trial court refused, submitting the
standard Pattern Jury Charge course of employment definition.22 The jury
failed to find that the employee was injured in the course of her employ-
ment, and the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment. The employee,
having failed to plead the access doctrine exception or request the trial
court to instruct the jury on the exception, had waived the doctrine as a
theory of recovery. Thus, the only salvation for the employee's cause of
action was the application of the personal comfort doctrine, which the
court of civil appeals applied in reversing the trial court without analysis
and with little discussion.
The court of civil appeals cited two "facts" to justify the application of
the personal comfort doctrine. First, Continental "designated these spaces
for employee parking as a convenience to its employees., 23 This conven-
ience,' coupled with the second fact, that the employee was "preparing to
17. Statement of Facts at 253-56, 266-67, Weaver v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 567 S.W.2d
34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
18. Id. at 46, 327-28. Typically, the court chose to ignore certain facts which were unfa-
vorable to its desired conclusion. Even more disturbing, however, is the court making up
certain "facts" that support its desired holding even though the record clearly demonstrates
that the direct opposite fact has been established by uncontradicted testimony as demon-
strated by the factual assertion referred to in note 58 infra and accompanying text.
19. Statement of Facts at 268-69, 340-42.
20. id at 338-39.
21. 567 S.W.2d at 35. The definition requested was verbatim that contained in 2 STATE
BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 21.31 (1970): "An act on the employer's
premises necessary to the health, comfort, and convenience of an employee while within
working hours, during a lunch period, or while preparing to begin work or leave the prem-
ises, is not a departure from the course of employment."
22. 567 S.W.2d at 35. The definition submitted is found in 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 21.10 (1970):
"Injury in the course of employment" means any injury having to do with
and originating in the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer,
received by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the
affairs or business of his employer, whether upon the employer's premises or
elsewhere.
23. 567 S.W.2d at 36.
24. The court emphasized that the employee's right to park in the parking lot was de-
rived solely from her employment and that the employee could use the lot only while per-
forming her work duties. The court failed to note that gratuitously furnishing an employee
with a parking place would be exactly the same as gratuitously furnishing the employee with
transportation: "It is well settled that the mere gratuitous furnishing of transportation by the
employer as an accommodation to the employee and not as an integral part of the contract
of employment does not bring the employee who is injured while traveling on the streets and
highways within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act." Texas Gen. Indem.
Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tex. 1963) (citing American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Coleman,
157 Tex. 377, 303 S.W.2d 370 (1957); Oefinger v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 243 S.W.2d
469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ refd); Bozant v. Federal Underwriters Exch.,
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leave her employer's premises,"2 was, in the court's view, sufficient to ap-
ply the personal comfort doctrine to a classic going to and from work
problem. In so doing, however, the court has created a judicial mon-
strosity heretofore unknown to compensation law.2 6 The incorrectness of
the court's personal comfort holding is easily comprehended if one ana-
lyzes the theory of, and the practical reasons for, the personal comfort doc-
trine as it relates to the coverage formula of the Compensation Act.27
The Act requires that a compensable injury occur not only within the
time and space limits of the employment, but also in the course of an activ-
ity related to the employment.28 A worker injured while standing at his
work bench during working hours may not be entitled to compensation if
the injury results from his construction of a homemade bomb. Thus, the
particular activity being engaged in at the time of injury is of critical con-
cern. It is not necessary, however, to establish a work connected injury to
show that the activity was for the employer's direct benefit. It would be
unreasonable to deny compensation because a worker momentarily
159 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942, writ refd w.o.m.)). Of course, there was
no evidence that the employee's right to park her car in the parking lot was part of any
employment contract. In fact, the court of civil appeals admitted that the only evidence
available was that the parking facilities were provided "for the convenience of the [Conti-
nental] employees." 567 S.W.2d at 36.
25. 567 S.W.2d at 36. Nowhere in the opinion did the court attempt to analyze orjus-
tify its conclusion that the parking lot was part of the employer's premises. The court boldly
side-stepped that rather important detail by relying on a "fact" that the court invented, ie.,
the parking area was part of the consideration for the written lease agreement. See note 58
infra and accompanying text. The court simply held: "Since the parking spaces were pro-
vided Continental as part of the lease agreement, it is clear that . . . it was part of the
employer's premises." 567 S.W.2d at 36.
26. The court of civil appeals failed to acknowledge or distinguish two analogous cases
in which compensation was denied.
Dishman v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 440 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1969, writ refd n.r.e.), involved an employee injured while crossing the street to the laundry
building where she worked from a parking area not owned, rented or controlled by the
employer. The court affirmed the carrier's summary judgment stating:
The general rule is that injuries received by an employee while going to and
from work in order to be compensable must be sustained through the use of
ingress and egress actually situated on the property of the employer or in such
close proximity thereto as to be for all practical purposes a part of the prem-
ises of the employer. Stated another way if the means of ingress and egress
expose the employee to some risk or hazard to which the general public would
not be exposed the injury is compensable.
Id at 729. In Roberts v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 461 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1970, writ refd), the employee, before punching the time clock to begin work, secured
her supervisor's permission to use one of the employer's pasteboard boxes to mail various
items to her son, and was injured while carrying the box to her automobile, which was
parked on the employer's parking lot. The court affirmed the carrier's summary judgment
because: "The accident and appellant's injuries did not arise out of her employment; they
did not have to do with or originate in her employer's business; and she was not engaged in
her employer's affairs of business. . . . She was engaged on a purely personal mission, and
the injury was not compensable." Id at 430. Cf Shubert v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 467 S.W.2d
662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employee waiting for place
of employment to open was struck by automobile; injuries not compensable).
27. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
28. The time, space, and activity analysis is suggested by Professor Larson's "quantum
theory of work-connection." IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, §§ 29.10-.22.
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stopped his work to rest and regenerate his energy. By the same token, an
employee sleeping the entire work day is not engaged in any work con-
nected activity. The principle used to place the line of demarcation be-
tween work connected activities and non-work connected activities is the
personal comfort doctrine. This doctrine deals with the employee's at-
tempt to satisfy personal, physical needs and personal, physical comforts
within the hours of employment (or reasonably close thereto) and while on
the employer's premises. Eating, drinking, sleeping, resting, washing,
smoking, seeking fresh air, warmth, coolness, and toilet facilities, changing
clothes, care of clothes and personal appearance, as well as preparatory
and incidental acts a reasonable time before and after work, are the activi-
ties that are considered under the personal comfort doctrine.29 The doc-
trine's foundation is the indirect benefit the employer received from the
activity. For example, if the employee is allowed time to eat lunch, get a
drink of water, or momentarily rest, his work will progress with greater
efficiency. 0 Professor Larson suggests that the modern day inquiry in a
personal comfort activity should simply be whether the particular activity,
beneficial to the employer or not, was a part of the employment either
because of its general nature or because of the particular customs and
practices in a particular employment.3 '
Regardless of the principle used to measure a particular activity's work
connection, it is evident that the doctrine assumes that the time and space
requirements of course of employment are fulfilled. The sole inquiry is
directed to the particular activity engaged in at the time of injury and its
potential connection to the employment.32 The very definition the claim-
ant requested in Weaver restricts the doctrine's application to "an act on
the employer's premises 33 necessary to the employee's health, comfort,
and convenience. The few Texas cases recognizing and applying this doc-
trine have restricted its use to injuries resulting from activities connected to
personal physical needs or personal physical comfort.3 4
29. Id §§ 21.10-.84.
30. Id 9 20.10-.20.
3 1. Id Professor Larson illustrates the necessity for a more modem rationale for the
personal comfort doctrine with the facts in Industrial Comm'r v. McCarthy, 295 N.Y. 443,
68 N.E.2d 434 (1946). In that case it was customary for passing waiters to give one another
playful jabs and shoves. One waiter received not only a playful jab but also a knife between
his ribs. Obviously, such a jab was of no benefit to the employer. Thus, such an injury
would not be compensable under the indirect benefit theory. Professor Larson contends,
however, that if the pushing that caused the injury was common to the employment the
injury resulting thereform could be compensable because:
The Act does not expressly say that the employee must at the time of injury
have been benefitting his employer; it merely says that the injury must have
arisen in the course of the employment, so that if it can be shown that the
particular activity, beneficial or not, was indeed a part of this employment,
either because of its general nature or because of the particular customs and
practices in the individual plant, the statute is satisfied.
Id § 20.20, at 5-3.
32. Id §§ 21.00-.84.
33. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 21.31 (1970). See quo-
tation of the suggested issue at note 21 supra.
34. In the commentary accompanying the Pattern Jury Charge Committee's personal
[Vol. 33
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The Weaver court, confronted with the employee's waiver of the access
doctrine,35 the only viable doctrine applicable to the case, simply forced a
round peg into a square hole. The court's analysis consisted of three
"facts": (1) the parking lot was part of the employer's premises; (2) the
employer provided parking as a convenience to its employees; and (3) the
injury occurred while the employee prepared to leave the employer's
premises.36 The first logical inquiry under the personal comfort doctrine is
what "act" 37 or activity that led to the employee's injury is being analyzed
for its employment connection? Walking? Leaving work early? The trip
and fall? Secondly, how was the employee preparing to leave the em-
ployer's premises? To prepare means "to make ready beforehand for some
purpose: put into condition for a particular use, application, or disposi-
tion."38 The employee was actually walking to her automobile when she
slipped and fell. This would seem to be beyond mere "preparation."
More important, however, is the portent that the court's "preparing to
leave" holding has two analogous factual settings. In Weaver the distance
between the highrise office building and the parking lot was only several
hundred yards and the slip and fall occurred near the employee's car. The
court had no difficulty finding that the employee was "preparing to leave"
the employer's premises because the employee was walking the relatively
short distance to her car when the accident occurred. Thus, in the Weaver
setting, it is not difficult to conclude that any accident between the highrise
office building and the employee's car may be compensable. Suppose,
however, that the highrise office building is in a downtown area and the
building owner allows the employer twenty-five parking spaces in a 2,000
car multi-story parking garage ten blocks from the office building. The
comfort doctrine definition, the Committee states that the instruction is patterned after deci-
sions such as Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Davidson, 295 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1956, writ ref d n.r.e.). In Davidson the court held an employee's injury due to a
slip and fall while walking to a trash can to dispose of the remains of her lunch to be in the
course of her employment even though she was not furthering her employer's business af-
fairs and was not being paid during her 50 minute lunch break. The court noted that work
stoppage for a noon meal does not necessarily terminate the employment relationship if the
employee remains on the employer's premises at the employer's express or implied invita-
tion.
The only other Texas cases involving the "personal comfort doctrine" include Travelers
Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 345 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, writ refd n.r.e.),
where a fatal fall during the lunch break from a grain elevator under construction was held
compensable. An injury occurring from a fall in a bathtub while bathing on the employer's
premises and in accordance with the employer's knowledge and instruction was held com-
pensable in Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ihlenburg, 243 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 195 1, writ ref d). Mistakenly ingesting sodium nitrate rather than bicarbonate of
soda to relieve an indigestion attack was held compensable in Security Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Wakefield, 108 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1939), as was an injury occurring while the employee was
seeking toilet facilities. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 121 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1938, writ dism'd).
35. The employee did not plead the access doctrine exception nor request the trial court
to submit a definition of the exception in its course of employment instruction.
36. 567 S.W.2d at 36.
37. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 21.31 (1970).
38. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1790 (1961).
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employees are allowed to park free as a convenience 39 to the employees.
Some employees walk to and from the parking garage, some ride public
buses, and some ride taxis.
Using the Weaver court's specious reasoning one would conclude that
the ten block walk from the office building to the garage is "preparing to
leave" the employer's premises, so that a slip and fall occurring as an em-
ployee "almost reached"4 his automobile is a compensable injury. The
question then becomes, how far is "almost"-where does "almost" begin
and end?
Another inquiry is whether any part of or all of the walk on the public
streets and sidewalks of a downtown area is included as a part of "prepar-
ing to leave" the employer's premises. Is an injury occurring in block one
compensable? Block two, fifteen, nineteen? What about the employee
who does not walk but rides the public bus or a private taxi? Are those
activities covered as part of the employee's preparation to leave the prem-
ises?
If one were tempted to hold that an injury occurring on the public
streets and sidewalks between blocks one and twenty is compensable, there
would be a substantial conflict with the supreme court's recent holding in
Texas Compensation Insurance Co. v. Matthews,4 a going to and from
work case. Matthews held that the employer's premises does not extend
into the public streets where other members of the public are subjected to
common hazards.42 Will the Weaver court be compelled to exclude public
street injuries and include only public sidewalk injuries? If so, there may
be a conflict with the most liberal Texas premises holding, Kelly v. Travel-
ers Insurance Co.4 3 Kelly held that only the ten or twelve feet of public
sidewalk over which the employer exercised dominion and control consti-
tuted part of the employer's premises.' Thus, the Weaver court's reason-
ing results in coverage for the suburban highrise office worker but none for
the downtown office worker. Such discrimination between equally deserv-
ing employees because of the fortuitous location of the place of employ-
ment would be irrational.
Perhaps the most intriguing problems will be those inevitable extensions
of Weaver's "preparing to leave" the premises holding that involve time
and space deviations. Suppose the hypothetical downtown worker leaves
the office building at quitting time but is not injured until one hour after he
should have been at the garage. Does the employee walk out of the course
of employment if not on a direct route to the parking area? If so, when
does course of employment end and begin again? If time deviations are
39. One may assume that in order to avoid the Weaver court's holding in subsequent
cases, the employer need only testify that the parking area was not provided for employee
convenience. Perhaps, in some cases, employee convenience becomes a fact issue to be sub-
mitted and determined by a jury.
40. 567 S.W.2d at 35.
41. 519 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1974).
42. Id at 632.
43. 391 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ refd n.r.e.).
44. Id at 564-65.
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important, how much excess time constitutes a deviation? There are addi-
tional factors involving an infinite variety of places and reasons why a
particular employee may deviate from a direct path and time schedule.
For example, an employee is found beaten and robbed in the garage; is
that a compensable injury? In short, there is no stopping the process be-
gun by the Weaver court's "preparing to leave" holding. Moreover, the
workers demanding compensation will not be limited to those who park
their cars in the parking garage. If, as an example, a worker rides the bus
and must walk the same or a different twenty blocks to reach the bus stop,
a distinction between walking to the bus stop and walking to the parking
garage would seem at best arbitrary. Suppose the worker is not walking to
his car or bus at all, but walking home. If home is only twenty blocks
away, how can this worker be denied compensation merely because he did
not need to drive to work or ride the bus. Clearly, with its preparation to
leave work holding, the Weaver court has initiated a need for case by case
analysis of an endless array of factual situations which will inevitably lead
to the question whether a worker's fall down the stairway leading from his
bedroom to the front door as he leaves for work is compensable.
Another consideration ignored by the Weaver opinion is the destruction
of the "employer's premises" concept as it applies not only to the personal
comfort doctrine but to the access doctrine exception to the going to and
from work rule. The access doctrine was an arbitrary legal line drawn at
the employer's premises as a result of the compromise between the recog-
nition that course of employment was not strictly limited to the actual per-
formance of employment duties nor the actual hours of work and the
desire and need to extend compensation coverage to include the journey
between home and factory or office.45 Thus, injuries to employees with
fixed hours and places of work, while going to and from work, are covered
if they occur on the employer's premises.46 It is suggested that an analysis
of the Texas cases construing the term "premises" provides a simple key to
the application of that term to either the personal comfort doctrine or the
access doctrine. Stated simply, an area becomes a part of an employer's
premises if the employer has created or attempted to control the hazards
encountered by the employees, which hazards are not encountered by the
public generally, at least at that particular location. In Kelty v. Travelers
Insurance Co. 47 the ten or twelve feet of icy public sidewalk involved in
the employee's slip and fall was held to be a part of the employer's prem-
ises because the employer had assumed the responsibility for sidewalk
maintenance by "repeatedly cleaning the same and undertaking to remove
the ice. . . even on the very day the accident occurred. 48 In Texas Com-
pensation Insurance Co. v. Matthews,49 however, the court specifically held
that the employer had not exercised any control over the crosswalk in the
45. See notes 10, 11, 12 supra and accompanying text.
46. Id.
47. 391 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ refd n.r.e.).
48. Id. at 565.
49. 519 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1974).
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public street where the claimant was injured, noting further that the claim-
ant's injury resulted from a hazard faced by any member of the public
traveling the same route as the employee.50 Dishman v. Texas Employers'
Insurance Association5' best sums up the Kelty-Matthews type cases: "[I]f
the means of ingress and egress expose the employee to some risk or haz-
ard to which the general public would not be exposed the injury is com-
pensable. 52
A series of early cases, typically involving railway crossings or right of
ways, establishes the concept that an injury occurring either on the only
route or occurring on a normal route but, due to a special employment
created risk, was compensable even if the route was not physically part of
the employer's premises. The leading Texas case establishing this now
hoary principle is Lumberman's Reciprocal Association v. Behnken.53  In
holding a fatality occurring on a railroad crossing adjacent to the em-
ployer's plant compensable, the supreme court emphasized the fact that
the crossing was a necessary and the immediate means of access to the
premises, which presented the employee with a special danger not shared
by the public generally.54 The opinion expressing this principle in the
most articulate manner of any court before or since is Texas Employers'
Insurance Association v. Anderson5 5 written by Justice Looney of the Dal-
las court of civil appeals in 1939.56 The special employment created haz-
50. Id at 632.
51. 440 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
52. Id at 729. A similar coming and going access case is Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Clauder, 431 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref d n.r.e.). The decedent was
fatally injured in an automobile collision at the intersection of several West Texas oilfield
roads leading to the employer's plant. The roads were on private property but maintained
by the county and used by the public generally:
Irrespective of the question as to whether the deceased's automobile was on
a public highway ...the record shows that it [collision] occurred upon a
roadway over which the employer did not have possession or an exclusive
right to possession to the exclusion of others, and that the same was used by
various members of the public who had no connection whatsoever with the
deceased's employer.
Id at 583-84. Accord, Flores v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1046 (1972).
53. 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922).
54. The same day the Behnken opinion was delivered, the supreme court decided a
factually similar case, Kirby Lumber Co. v. Scurlock, 112 Tex. 115, 246 S.W. 76 (1922).
Consistent with Behnken the supreme court held that the employee's death, resulting from
being run down by the employer's train while traveling home on the employer's railroad
tracks, occurred in the course of his employment because it grew out of an employment
created hazard not shared by the public generally. Kirby is an "upside-down" case because
the beneficiaries were trying to prove that the deceased was not an employee and was not
covered by the Act, thus allowing a death action to be pursued against the employer which
has, of course, more damage potential than a compensation action.
55. 125 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, writ ref d).
56. Other cases involving this established exception to the going to and from work rule
are: Flores v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1046
(1972); Smith v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 129 Tex. 573, 105 S.W.2d 192 (1937); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Clauder, 431 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ refd
n.r.e.);Viney v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 82 S.W.2d 1088 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935,




ard principle established by Behnken and other cases had two basic
recurring elements. The first is the presence of the special employment
created hazard not shared by the public generally, at least at the particular
site involved in the injury. The second is the close association of the access
route with the premises, the clearest case occurring when the route in-
volved is the only means of access. A compensable case is not shown,
however, simply because there is only one means of access. There must
also be proof of the first element, a special employment created hazard not
shared by the public generally. 7
The Weaver court's holding that the parking lot formed a part of the
employer's premises because the parking area was provided to the em-
ployer as part of the lease agreement, a "fact" unsupported by the evi-
dence,58 put the court into a position to apply the otherwise inapplicable
personal comfort doctrine. The only real consideration is whether the em-
ployer created or attempted to control the hazard causing the accident and
whether that hazard was one unique to the employment at that particular
location and not one shared by the public generally. In Weaver the evi-
dence was undisputed that the employer was totally deprived, legally and
factually, of any control over any hazard lurking in a flat asphalt parking
lot.59 Moreover, the parking lot was used by various building tenants as
well as employees of tenants, visitors, and business persons transacting
business in the buildings.6" These parking lot users were, vis-a-vis the em-
ployee and her employer, members of the public. The employee shared all
the parking lot dangers with other persons using the lot. These dangers, in
particular the danger of a slip and fall, were not of the employer's creation
or unique to the employee because of her employment, but rather common
to all who ventured into the area. The Weaver court chose to forsake these
time-tested principles and in so doing has thrust upon any employer who
provides employee parking as a "convenience" incalculable risk and unde-
fined premium increases.
In another to and from work case the El Paso court had little difficulty in
finding the employee was not in the course of employment although the
court did not specifically apply the to and from work doctrine. In Price v.
American Home Assurance Co.6 the employee worked twenty-five hours
in a total twenty-eight hour period at her employer's restaurant where she
57. Flores v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1046 (1972).
58. Contrary to the court's assertion, 567 S.W.2d at 35-36, the written lease agreement
did not provide that the building owner would furnish the parking spaces in the particular
parking lot involved to Continental as "part of the consideration involved in the [lease
agreement]." Id at 36. The building owner provided parking immediately behind and
under the building as part of the lease agreement and gratuitously allowed Continental em-
ployees to park in a lot behind an adjacent highrise office building that it also owned. State-
ment of Facts at 5, 10, 25-26, 69-70, 256-57, 275-82, 340.
59. It was undisputed that Continental did not own, control, lease, manage, rent, super-
vise, maintain, repair, or exercise any domain over the parking lot where the accident oc-
curred. Statement of Facts at 10-11, 16-17, 68-69, 72-74, 269-73, 277-78.
60. Id at 5, 10, 25-26. 69-70, 256-57, 275-82, 340.
61. 562 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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was a waitress-cashier. While driving home after completing her last shift,
she went to sleep and hit the rear of another vehicle. Since the employee's
travel was not within the terms of the Act's travel provisions,62 the em-
ployee's cause of action was necessarily governed by the definition of in-
jury in the course of employment in article 8309, section 1.63
On appeal from the trial court's take-nothing judgment, the employee
argued that the sleep-induced automobile accident had its origins in the
long hours required by her employment and, therefore, the injuries
"originated" in the employment as required by the Act.64 The El Paso
court recognized that it was arguable that the employment's long hours
may have been the accident's origin such as to satisfy section l's second
requirement that the injury originate in the employer's work.65 The court
held, however, that the section's first requirement, that the accident result
while the employee is engaged in or about the furtherance of the em-
ployer's affairs," was not satisfied by merely showing that the injury oc-
curred while the employee was "on a personal trip going to her home from
her place of employment. 67
The statement that the employee's trip to her home was a "personal
trip" is merely a convenient conclusion necessary to support the proposi-
tion that she was not furthering the employer's affairs. Obviously, this
conclusion is debatable since one must readily concede that the employee
could not have performed her duties anywhere except the employer's
premises and, therefore, the sole purpose of the trip to and from work was
for the employer's direct benefit. Thus, it is logical to conclude that the
employment-necessitated travel coupled with the employment-induced
sleep resulted in an injury in the course of employment. As has already
been indicated,68 the noncompensability of the to and from work cases
results from the placement of an arbitrary legal line necessitated by the
virtually unanimous belief that workers' compensation is not portal to por-
tal health insurance against all conceivable perils.69 It is suggested, there-
fore, that the courts, rather than engage in mental gymnastics as in Price,
should simply state that the denial of compensation in a to and from work
case is based on the placement of a necessary legal line beyond which only
the legislature may venture.
Personal Comfort Doctrin. While the personal comfort doctrine was obvi-
ously misapplied by the Weaver court, two other Texas courts, by accident,
62. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § Ib (Vernon 1967).
63. Id. § i. See quotation of the section's pertinent provisions at note 6 supra.
64. Id
65. See note 7 supra and cases cited therein, as well as accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. 562 S.W.2d at 9.
68. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
69. Cf. Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972) (heart
attack not compensable because not traceable to specific incident at place of employment);
Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Biber, 146 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940,
writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (cerebral hemorrhage not compensable since causal relationship
between employment and injury not proved).
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properly sustained two compensation awards in cases involving facts
clearly within the doctrine's parameters. These two opinions vividly illus-
trate the need for courts to hold to viable theories that produce long-term
consistency rather than result oriented theories which lead to short term
confusion.
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Villasana7° the employee
took his regular work break in the foreman's office. When he arose from
the chair at the end of his break, he slipped and fell, striking his head on a
cabinet. Although the accident, as well as the resulting disability,7 was
vigorously contested, the jury found all issues in the employee's favor."
The court's opinion does not provide any clues as to what legal issues it
considered when reviewing the carrier's no evidence point attacking the
jury's first three findings relating to injury, accident, and course of employ-
ment. Further, the court, having somehow avoided the personal comfort
doctrine, made an assertion never before seen in Texas compensation law:
To establish that his. . . injury occurred in the course of his employ-
ment. . . [claimant] could show that the injury arose out of, and was
causally connected with, his employment, either through its activities,
its conditions, or its environments, Garcia v. Texas Indemnity Ins.
Co., . . . which may include an act of a personal nature that, if rea-
sonably done for his health and comfort, was incidental to his service
and, thereby, arose out of his employment. Insurance Company of
North America v. Estep .... 73
The court neither explained nor attempted to analyze this bold assertion
in relation to the claimant's injury, simply holding that the evidence was
legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Furthermore,
70. 558 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
71. The carrier also contested the extent and duration of disability allegedly resulting
from the accident. The admission of medical testimony constituted the carrier's attack on
the jury's total permanent finding. See note 196 infra.
72. According to the court's opinion the trial court submitted and the jury answered a
special issue inquiring whether the employee's injury was the result of an accident. 558
W.2d at 920. The submission of this issue simply illustrates a lack of sophistication con-
cerning compensation law. Although the issue is harmless, it does require a jury's considera-
tion and conceivably could engender conduct resulting in a mistrial.
The Compensation Act has never required that an injury result from an "accident" or be
the product of an "accidental injury." These words do not now and never have appeared in
any version of the Act. "Accident" and "accidental injury" are inventions of various appel-
late courts. They are used in contradistinction to intentional injury or other risks and
hazards excluded by TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967), and to occu-
pational disease, which is defined in id. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). See Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mincey, 255 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Agan, 252 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1952, writ refd). "Accidental injury" is simply a proof requirement. In an "accidental in-
jury" case the claimant must produce evidence of an event traceable to a definite time, place,
and cause or his cause of action fails. Unless the carrier contends that the accident is an
occupational disease or resulted from some excluded risk, the submission of an issue regard-
ing 'accident" or "accidental injury" is superfluous. Naturally, if the claimant's evidence is
so weak as to raise only a surmise or suspicion of the existence of an event causing an injury
then an issue must be submitted regarding the occurrence of the alleged "accidental injury."
73. 558 S.W.2d at 920 (emphasis added).
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not a single one of the court's citations is even remotely related to the
course of employment issue, which is the focal point of the case. For ex-
ample, the court cited Garcia v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Co.,7 4 which
involved an idiopathic fall.7 5 By definition76 an idiopathic fall occurs be-
cause of a pre-existing personal physical condition, disease, or weakness
unrelated to the employment. Since the employee is always engaged in his
employment duties at the time of injury (otherwise there could never be an
idiopathic fall), the only inquiry in a Texas idiopathic fall case is the
"causal connection between the conditions under which ... [the em-
ployee's] work was required to be performed and his resulting injury."7 7
It is difficult, if not impossible, to analogize an idiopathic fall case to one
involving a Villasana-like fact situation. The Amarillo court, however,
managed to compare an even more difficult concept to the Villasana fact
situation. To support the proposition that an employee's act, done for his
health and comfort, is within the course of employment, the court cited
Insurance Co. of North America v. Estep,7 8 another Amarillo court opinion
which involved an assault by a co-employee. Estep is highly questiona-
ble7 9for its assault holding, but it is clear that it does not involve any fac-
tual or legal issues involved in a Villasana-like fact situation especially
since the area of employee assaults is specifically governed by statute.8 0
Despite the court's obvious lack of knowledge regarding the personal com-
fort doctrine, the result reached was entirely correct. Unfortunately, the
court attempted to solve an uncomplicated problem by inventing a new
and complicated, but totally erroneous, injury in the course of employment
definition. Obviously, the court's task would have been relatively easy had
they but found the personal comfort doctrine. 8' In essence, the personal
comfort doctrine simply says that incidental acts such as eating, drinking,
resting, and washing, which occur on the employer's premises and within
working hours, are not departures from the course of employment but
rather recognized needs of human beings and injuries resulting from such
activities are compensable. 2 Texas has recognized and applied this doc-
trine since at least 1933 when the Dallas court upheld an award of com-
pensation for an employee crossing the street to purchase medicine for his
74. 146 Tex. 413, 209 S.W.2d 333 (1948).
75. Idiopathic is defined as "peculiar to the individual ... arising spontaneously or
from an obscure or unknown cause." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY 1123 (1961). The Texas idiopathic fall doctrine differs from that applied in the majority
of jurisdictions as illustrated by the supreme court's shortsighted opinion in Texas Employ-
ers' Ins. Ass'n v. Page, 553 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. 1977). The Page rationale is noted, discussed,
and criticized in Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 335-38.
76. See note 75 supra. The supreme court also provided a definition of idiopathic taken
from a medical dictionary. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Page, 553 S.W.2d 98, 100 n.2
(Tex. 1977).
77. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Page, 553 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Tex. 1977).
78. 501 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ refd n.r.e.).
79. This opinion is noted, discussed, and criticized in Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensa-
tion, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 183, 204-05'(1975).
80. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(2) (Vernon 1967).
81. See notes 21, 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
82. IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, §§ 21.10-.84.
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supposed case of flu. 3
Perhaps even more mystifying than the Villasana court's new definition
of injury in the course of employment was its approval of the course of
employment instruction that the trial court submitted to the jury.84 The
instruction is totally incorrect and furthermore it appears doubtful that
lawyers, much less a lay jury, could apply such an instruction to a given
fact situation. The instruction's second paragraph is totally foreign to arti-
cle 8309, section 185 and the dual requirements emanating from the hun-
dreds of cases interpreting its application to hundreds of differing factual
settings.86 The instruction's first paragraph is a poor attempt to paraphrase
the personal comfort doctrine but results in a restrictive application be-
cause it limits the employee's recovery to only acts "of a personal na-
ture."87 Without defining "personal nature" the court runs the risk that a
jury may interpret the words to include only human bodily functions of a
personal nature. A correct definition of course of employment as well as
the personal comfort doctrine has been contained in the Pattern Jury
Charge book since its publication in 1970.88 It is beyond comprehension
that eight years after the publication of a significant milestone in Texas
jurisprudence, there are still apparently some judges and lawyers unaware
of the work of the Pattern Jury Charge Committee.
The second court, facing a personal comfort dilemma, fared little better
83. Parker v. Royal Indem. Co., 59 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933, no writ).
The entire line of Texas personal comfort doctrine cases traceable back to Parker include
the following: Security Mut. Cas.-Co. v. Wakefield, 108 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1939) (mistakenly
ingesting sodium nitrate rather than bicarbonate of soda to relieve an indigestion attack held
compensable); Travelers Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 345 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1961, writ refd n.r.e.) (fatal fall during lunch break from grain elevator under construction
held compensable); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Davidson, 295 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1956, writ ref d n.r.e.) (slip and fall injury on employer's premises during
lunch break held compensable); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ihlenburg, 243 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951, writ refd) (fall in a bathtub while bathing on the employer's
premises in accordance with the employer's knowledge and instruction held compensable);
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 121 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1938, writ
dism'd) (injury occurring while employee sought to toilet facilities held compensable).
84. The court quoted the instructions in the opinion:
You are instructed that an employee may in the course of his employment
do any act of a personal nature reasonably necessary to his health and comfort
and an injury sustained in the performance thereof is sustained in the course
and scope of employment.
You are further instructed that an employee may have an accidental injury
due to a cause not related to his employment, but if the injury would not have
occurred except for the performance of his employment, then such an injury is
sustained in the course and scope of employment.
558 S.W.2d at 921.
85. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
86. See, e.g., notes 7 and 8 supra and accompanying text. The dual requirements are:
(1) the injury occurred while the employee was engaged in the furtherance of the employer's
affairs; (2) the injury was of a kind and character that had to do with and originated in the
employer's work, business, trade, or profession. Id.
87. 558 S.W.2d at 921.
88. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES §§ 21.10, 21.31 (1970).
See note 21 supra and the quotation of the personal comfort doctrine instruction from the
Pattern Jury Charge Committee.
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in its analysis than did the Villasana court, but again, fortunately reached
the correct result. Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Prasek89 in-
volved an employee's choking to death on a piece of steak.9" The em-
ployee was a tool pusher on an oil rig on call twenty-four hours per day.
He was free to go home to eat and sleep, but the employer provided a
trailer house, stocked with food, at the rig site for employees to eat and
sleep whenever they chose not to leave the rig. The evidence was undis-
puted that the employee frequently ate and slept in the trailer especially
when his presence was required during crucial drilling operations.
On the night of the employee's death his wife, who stayed in the trailer
while the employee supervised the drilling operation, prepared a steak din-
ner. While eating the steak the employee collapsed and died of food aspi-
ration. The jury found all course of employment issues favorable to the
widow. On appeal, the carrier argued that choking to death on a food
particle was not a hazard originating in or peculiar to the employment but
was a hazard common to the public generally.
The Corpus Christi court, contrary to the Amarillo court in Villasana,
properly recognized at least some of the elements of the personal comfort
doctrine but only cited one Texas personal comfort case among its string of
citations, 91 that being a lunch time injury held to be compensable by the
Fort Worth court of civil appeals in 1956.92 The remaining cases in-
volved a going to and from work case93 and an assault by a co-employee.94
Unfortunately, the court never analyzed the personal comfort doctrine as it
applied to the undisputed facts. Rather, the court simply ignored legal
principles, concluding that there was ample evidence demonstrating that
the injury " 'originated in' or 'had to do with' the employer's work
[and was sufficient] to meet 'the two prong course of employment test.' ,5
89. 569 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. The so-called "cafe coronary" is apparently not an uncommon mode of exitus. See
Heimlick, A Life-Saving Maneuver to Prevent Food-Choking, 234 J.A.M.A. 398 (1975).
91. The court wrote:
[W]e note that an employee need not have been engaged in the discharge of
any specific duty incident to his employment; rather an employee in the course
of his employment may perform acts of a personal nature that a person might
reasonably do for his health and comfort, such as quenching thirst or relieving
hunger. Such acts are considered as incidental to the employee's service and
the injuries sustained while doing so arise in the course of employment and
are compensable. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, 125 S.W.2d 674(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, writ ref'd); Insurance Company of North Amer-
ica v. Estep, 501 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ refd n.r.e.);
Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Davidson, 295 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1956, writ refd n.r.e.); 62 Tex. Jur. 2d, Workmen's Com-
pensation, § 92 (1965).
569 S.W.2d at 548.
92. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Davidson, 295 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1956, writ refd n.r.e.).
93. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, 125 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1939, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
94. Insurance Co. of North America v. Estep, 501 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See notes 78 & 79 supra and accompanying text.
95. 569 S.W.2d at 548.
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To bolster their holding the court cited two Texa3 cases,96 neither of which
were relevant to the issues involved in the appeal, and two out of state
cases, both of which were relevant to the issues.9 7 The court, however,
failed to analyze these two cases which provided a perfect, easy ready-
made solution for its dilemma.
The various courts of the United States have long recognized that on
premises, lunch-time injuries are compensable even though they techni-
cally occur outside regular employment hours and the employees are gen-
erally free of the employer's control.98 Professor Larson explains the
generally accepted rationalization:99
In any case, most courts have concluded that the unpaid lunch hour
on the premises should be deemed to fall within the course of employ-
ment. One can arrive at this result by the following chain or argu-
ment: If going to and from work on the premises is covered, then
going to and from lunch on the premises must also be covered; if go-
ing to and from lunch on the premises is in the course of employment,
then simply remaining on the premises for lunch must also be. The
actual eating of lunch is no more remote from the employment than
the traveling to it; and both are outside strict hours and within the
premises. There is no ground for distinction.
Obviously, if the journey to and from an employer's lunchroom is
within the course of employment, any hazard associated with the con-
sumption of food furnished by the employer is also within the course of
employment. I° Injuries associated with the lunch brought by the em-
ployee may also be compensable.' 0 The foregoing principles are gener-
ally applicable to employees with fixed hours of employment and fixed
places of employment. Even so, it is perfectly apparent that the Prasek
96. Campbell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 378 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), involved an employee's death when he jumped or fell from a boat while
attending a company-sponsored picnic. While there are some vague similarities between the
issues involved in the recreational-social activities cases and personal comfort cases, they are
not analogous. Compare IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, §§ 21.10-.84 with id. §§ 22.10-.30.
The second case, Southern Sur. Co. v. Shook, 44 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1931, writ ref'd), involved the brutal, premeditated murder of two brothers, one of whom
was employed as a 24-hour-a-day watchman. The issue involved was the assault by a third
party exclusion in TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN, art. 8309, § 1(2) (Vernon 1967). This exclu-
sion is in no way analogous to choking to death while eating a meal in the employer's trailer
and on the employer's premises.
97. St. Alexandre v. Texas Co., 28 So. 2d 385 (La. App. 1946), involved an injury result-
ing from the employee's attempt to open a soft drink bottle. The employer attempted to
distinguish between drinking water which the employer furnished in recognition of the ne-
cessity to quench thirst and drinking a soft drink which the employee brought to the prem-
ises for his own pleasure. The Louisiana court rejected the argument, affirming the
compensation award and recognizing that the refreshing activity need not be strictly neces-
sary if it is reasonably incidental to the employment.
In Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ariz. 398, 158 P.2d 511 (1945), the
injury also occurred from an exploding soft drink bottle which the employee brought with
him and was placing in a water cooler to cool for his lunch. The court affirmed a compensa-
tion award.
98. IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, § 21.21(a).
99. Id at 5-10 (footnote omitted).
100. Id. § 21.22.
101. Id § 21.21(c).
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case could easily be analyzed using the accepted analysis applicable to that
class of case. Moreover, the personal comfort doctrine has been extended
to employees required to live on the employer's premises as well as em-
ployees such as Prasek who are continuously on call.' 02 In fact, the on-call
employee is in a stronger position than the 8:00 to 5:00 employee not being
paid during a lunch break because the on-call employee is being paid dur-
ing the mealtime. Such was the factual situation presented to the Prasek
court. It is submitted that the correct analysis of that factual situation is
the generally accepted and understood personal comfort doctrine rather
than the Texas courts' dual requirement test of course of employment.
Acts Outside Regular Duties. Modern day compensation law provides that
an injury resulting from an activity undertaken by an employee, in good
faith, to assist a co-employee in the latter's work is an injury sustained in
the course of employment. 0 3 This year the Tyler court updated Texas law
in this area in Dallas County v. Romans. 4 The employee, a "turn-key" at
the Dallas County jail, arrived at the jail prior to his shift and agreed to
relieve the turn-key on duty so the latter could go to the restroom. While
relieving the co-employee, the claimant pushed open the steel door in the
turn-key's booth and allegedly suffered a heart attack from the exertion.
The evidence revealed that the claimant was on call twenty-four hours a
day, was not paid by the hour, and did not punch a time clock. In addi-
tion, the evidence revealed that the turn-keys habitually relieved each
other before their shifts began and there was no evidence that the county
ever objected to such procedure. It was also undenied that someone had to
be in the turn-key booth at all times. Thus, whenever the turn-key on duty
needed to go to the restroom, someone was required to temporarily attend
to the turn-key's job. Following a jury verdict favorable to the claimant,
the county appealed, contending the injury was not sustained in the course
of employment. In an uninspired and confusing opinion the court con-
cluded that the claimant was performing the job he was employed to per-
form, was furthering the employer's affairs, and was thus in the course of
employment at the time of injury.
The court's holding as expressed in the opinion is confusing. Summa-
rized, the holding seems simplistic but in fact is exceedingly difficult to
comprehend from the court's writing. The holding, however, should be
uncomplicated because the reason for the holding is simple:
[I]t would be contrary not only to human nature but to the em-
ployer's best interest to forbid employees to help each other on pain of
losing compensation benefits for any injuries thereby sustained. This
is well illustrated by the cases in which the claimant, who has ceased
to work at a particular machine, goes to the aid of his successor who is
having trouble operating the machine. One can imagine the displeas-
ure the claimant would incur from his employer if, in such a situation,
102. Id §§ 24.10-.40.
103. Id §§ 27.10-.14.
104. 563 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
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he failed to bring his experience to the assistance of the new employee
on the technicality that it was not within the scope of his present du-
ties. 105
Social Activities. The Tyler court handed down a second opinion involv-
ing course of employment in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Musick. °6 The
claimant, a concrete truck driver, was working with a crew on a construc-
tion site near Greenville. The crew foreman suggested having a barbecue
for the crew, purportedly to encourage them to finish the job quickly, and
the claimant agreed to allow the function to be held on land he owned. On
the appointed Saturday afternoon, the claimant and several co-employees
dug the barbecue pit using some of the company's equipment, and then
drove in the claimant's personal pickup truck to a lake located on a neigh-
bor's property in order to "clean up." While diving into the lake, however,
the claimant was injured.
The court, without deciding and in fact questioning whether the barbe-
cue itself was within the scope of employment, held, as a matter of law,
that the act of diving into the neighbor's lake was not an act within the
social or recreational activities contemplated in putting on a barbecue.
This was especially true, the court pointed out, because the employee left
the social activity, the barbecue, to go elsewhere and engage in a "danger-
ous activity."' 7 Thus, the court reversed and rendered judgment for the
carrier.
Musick presented a factual setting somewhat different from the usual
recreational-social activity case in which the only question is whether the
injury resulting from the slide into second base at the annual softball game
at the annual company picnic is in the course of employment. This is usu-
ally resolved by reference to the degree of employer involvement in spon-
sorship and encouragement of employees to attend. 1°8 Texas, although
105. IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, § 27.12, at 5-256 to -257.
106. 562 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
107. Id at 40. The opinion notes that the evidence is unclear as to the number of times
the employee dove from the diving board into the lake prior to the injury. Obviously, the
court would have reached the same result whether it was dive number one or dive number
twenty. It is interesting to note that the court rather arbitrarily classified diving into a lake
as a dangerous activity. Swimming and diving into a lake, however, would not generally be
considered to be dangerous activities, at least not until after the person is injured. The court
has used this terminology, obviously, to strengthen the conclusion that the claimant left the
course of his employment, if it is assumed the barbecue was part of the employment, to
pursue an activity clearly unconnected with the employment.
108. Professor Larson sums up what appears to be the prevailing view on recreational
and social activities:
Recreational or social activities are within the course of employment when(1) They occur on the premises during a lunch or recreation period as a
regular incident of the employment; or
(2) The employer, by expressly or impliedly requiring participation, or by
making the activity part of the services of an employee, brings the activity
within the orbit of the employment; or
(3) The employer derives substantial direct benefit from the activity be-
yond the intangible value of improvement in employee health and morale that
is common to all kinds of recreation and social life.
IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, § 22, at 5-71.
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having few opinions in the recreational-social area, follows the analysis
used by the majority of jurisdictions.' 9 The difference presented by Mu-
sick is that the slide into second base at the annual softball game is part of
the expected, planned activity from which the employer can foresee (al-
109. There are few Texas cases involving recreational-social activities. What appears to
be one of the first decided cases on the subject is Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v Strawn, 44
S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931, writ refd). In Strawn the employee was injured
while on a duck hunt with his general manager and a customer. The Waco court, with little
analysis, had no difficulty in holding that the injury occurred in the course of employment.
The court cited a Fifth Circuit opinion, Constitution Indem. Co v. Shytles, 47 F.2d 441 (5th
Cir. 1931), as well as an Illinois Supreme Court opinion. The Shytes case was somewhat
analogous, but the Illinois case was not. Shytles involved a theater manager killed in a
plane crash en route to attend the opening ceremonies of a new airport. It was undisputed
that the employer desired the manager to attend various civic functions as a means of estab-
lishing community goodwill and, therefore, the carrier conceded that the injury originated in
the employer's business and occurred while the employee was furthering the employer's
affairs. The injury was excluded from coverage, the carrier argued, because the statutory
definition of employee, which was the same in 1931 as the current definition in TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967), excluded employees whose work was not
within the confines of the employer's usual business. Since the employer's usual business
involved movies, the decedent's travel to a civic function was not within the definition. The
court rejected the argument, holding that activities undertaken to advertise the employer's
business were clearly a part of the employer's usual business pursuits. The analysis of
Shytes clearly reveals that it offers no support for the Strawn court's holding. Nevertheless,
the Strawn court's holding, supported by authority or not, is obviously correct.
The next recreational-social case was Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Chitwood, 199
S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1946, no writ), wherein a liquor wholesale employee
was instructed to help his supervisor take a beer keg to a bar. After delivering the keg, the
supervisor was giving the bar owner a ride home when the automobile was struck by a train.
The court held that the employee was in the course of employment because doing the bar
owner a favor was calculated to cultivate the customer's goodwill which was a part of the
supervisor's employment duties. To support its holding, the court cited Strawn and Shyles
as well as several other opinions which were completely unrelated to recreational-social ac-
tivities.
Campbell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 378 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ
ref'd n.r.e ), is one of two Texas cases factually analogous to Musick. In Campbell the em-
ployee drowned while on a company-sponsored fishing trip and weekend party. The court
held the injury not compensable because the employee was not required to attend, was not
paid while attending, and no customers were present at the party. The court relied upon
several out of state cases with similar factual settings, pointing out that it had not been
referred to any Texas case dealing with company-sponsored outings.
In Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Sanderfer, 382 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1964, writ refd n.r e.), the vice president of the insured company was injured when he fell
from a deer stand while hunting with several of his company's customers. The court held
that since the claimant's presence at the lease was to promote customer goodwill, the injury
occurred in the course of his employment. The court cited Shyt/es and Chitwood in support
of its holding.
The second Texas opinion factually analogous to Musick and the most articulate, well
reasoned opinion on the subject of recreational-social injuries is Clevenger v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 396 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The employee was
injured while playing baseball at the company-sponsored picnic. The court recited the facts
in detail, concluding that the trial court incorrectly granted the insurer's motion for in-
structed verdict. To support its holding the court relied upon Professor Larson's treatise as
well as the Sanderfer opinion.
Although there are only a handful of Texas cases involved with the recreational-social
fact situations, the results appear to be uniformly correct even though the holdings are not
always supported by the cited authority. Musick appears to be another correctly decided
recreational-social activity case albeit the facts presented compel a slightly different analysis
than does a routine company picnic as was presented in Clevenger.
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though not required as an element of proof) and expect injuries to result,
whereas swimming and diving are not part of the activity expected at a
simple barbecue. Thus, it appears altogether proper to inquire, as did the
Musick court, whether the injury related activity represents a deviation
from the planned activities or from activities the employer would reason-
ably expect to be pursued.
Intoxication. Section 1 of article 8309' 'o provides that injuries caused by
an act of God, an act of a third person for reasons personal to that person,
and injuries received "while in a state of intoxication""' are not compen-
sable. The first two exclusions are somewhat susceptible to judicial inter-
pretation. The "intoxication" exclusion, however, has never been defined.
This lack of guidance is curious to say the least because the Texas statute
denies compensation for any degree of "intoxication." There is no middle
ground, no room for any subtle gradations, only black or white. A good
example of this "either or" dilemma occurred in Westchester Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Wendeborn.1" 2
The decedent, manager of a convenience store, was accidentally shot
with his own gun as he handed it to a customer who admitted that he and
the decedent had been drinking beer throughout the afternoon and eve-
ning of the accident. The customer admitted that he was intoxicated." 3
Four witnesses testified that the decedent was not intoxicated. An autopsy
revealed a 0.165 mg. blood alcohol content. The pathologist testified that
the decedent was intoxicated when he was shot. The jury concluded that
the decedent was not intoxicated and judgment was entered for the widow.
On appeal the carrier contended, among other things,' 14 that a 0.165 mg.
percent blood alcohol content should constitute intoxication as a matter of
law. The carrier relied upon the "presumption" of intoxication set forth in
the traffic regulations," 5 but the court of civil appeals rejected the argu-
ment, holding that the pathologist's testimony did not conclusively estab-
lish intoxication at the time of the shooting.
The all or nothing Texas approach to intoxication creates results similar
to Wendeborn-a full recovery for an employee whose judgment and
physical skills are obviously impaired by voluntary alcohol abuse. This all
110. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN art. 8309, § 1(3) (Vernon 1967).
111. Id
112. 559 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
113. The opinion clearly states that the customer, Smoot, was inebriated: "Smoot stated
he was intoxicated and he and. . . [the decedent] had been drinking beer during the after-
noon and evening prior to the shooting." Id at 109. This statement is somewhat curious
since it would seem to follow that if Smoot testified that he, Smoot, was intoxicated, he
probably would have also implicated the decedent as being intoxicated. The court does not
note any testimony from Smoot on the issue of the decedent's intoxication. It is difficult to
believe that no one asked Smoot his opinion on intoxication. Thus, if the Eastland court
follows the rule of most other Texas appellate courts, it can be assumed that the failure to
mention Smoot's testimony on the decedent's intoxication means that Smoot's opinion was
that the decedent was intoxicated.
114. See notes 124-29 infra and accompanying text.
115. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701/-5 (Vernon 1977).
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or nothing interpretation results from the statute's wording which leaves
no room for any other interpretation.'' 6 It is submitted that the Texas
statute should be legislatively rewritten to do away with the inequities
which can result from the all or nothing approach. For example, the non-
driving member of a long distance truck driving team who drinks one beer
thirty minutes before completing the trip and is injured in a traffic accident
through no fault of the driver may be denied compensation by an East
Texas jury because he was "intoxicated." On the other hand, the truck
driver who overturns his rig at ninety-five miles per hour is found to have
a 0.390 blood alcohol level may not be intoxicated according to a Harris
County jury. Different states have taken differing statutory approaches to
intoxication, with none providing consistent, satisfactory results in all
cases." 7 One approach apparently not considered by the various states
would be to allow the fact finder to assess the percentage that the alcohol
indulgence contributed to the occurrence of the accident and to the result-
ing injury and disability. This percentage contribution could then be used
as a direct reduction of the employee's recovery. This would not eliminate
all problems associated with alcohol induced injuries, but it would specifi-
cally direct the fact finder to consider pertinent factors involved in the con-
tribution of alcohol to the entire accident-injury-disability dispute beyond
that required by the nonspecific inquiry of whether someone is "intoxi-
cated."' 18
Violation of Employer's Instructions. Injuries resulting from a violation of
the employer's instructions are generally considered to be course of em-
ployment problems. For example, a machinist, contrary to his employer's
rules, uses the employer's equipment to turn machine gun shells into ciga-
rette lighters during work hours and injures his left eye when a shell ex-
plodes." 9 The employee's conduct is clearly a departure from the course
116. In Employers' Cas. Co. v. Watson, 32 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1930,
no writ), and Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Durham, 222 S.W. 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1920, writ dism'd), both courts of civil appeals held that intoxication, to be a de-
fense, must be a proximate cause of the accident and injuries. In other words, the intoxica-
tion must have contributed to the happening of the accident.
In 1933, however, the present day interpretation was articulated by the commission of
appeals in Dill v Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 63 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Comm n App. 1933, judgmt
adopted). The Dill court overruled both Watson and Durham and held that proof of intoxi-
cation, whether it contributed to the accident or injury, was sufficient to bar compensation.
Whether a person was intoxicated at the time of injury was held to be a jury issue.
117. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, §§ 34.00-.35. Thirty-six states make intoxication a
separate defense and three others provide that intoxication causes an arbitrary reduction in
the amount awarded, two of the states reduce by fifteen percent and one by fifty percent. Id.
34.31, at 6-62. These statutory schemes require a wide variety of causal connection factors
etween the intoxication and the injury. Some require a proximate causal connection,
others a primary, direct, whole, or partial causal connection and a few the sole causal con-
nection. Id
118. One other intoxication case was also decided during this survey year although the
court was not required to consider the intoxication issue since the employee waived, in one
way or another, all of the asserted trial court errors. Farias v. Texas Gen. Indem., 565
S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
119. Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Gilbert, 65 Ariz. 379, 181 P.2d 624 (1947).
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of employment because the employee is engaged in a personal activity dur-
ing working hours, an activity he knows is specifically and strictly prohib-
ited. Nothing in the employee's conduct advances the employer's work.
Thus, there is no employment connection which argues for compensability.
On the other hand, the mere violation of an instruction related to the
method of accomplishing the employer's work does not remove an injury
from the course of employment. For example, an employee operates a
meat grinder with the guard removed in spite of the employer's instruc-
tions not to remove the guard.' ° This conduct is within the course of
employment because at the time of injury the employee is performing the
exact task he was hired to perform, albeit in a manner different from that
contemplated by the employer.
The distinction between these two examples is the fact that the machinist
was doing forbidden work while the meat grinder was doing work in a
forbidden manner. This distinction was apparently recognized by the
Texas Supreme Court in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Brown. 121 In Brown v.
Forum Insurance Co. 122 the Dallas court of civil appeals applied the
course of employment analysis begun in the supreme court's Brown case.
The court held that the employee's choice of flying a private aircraft in
direct violation of the employer's rule was related to the method of per-
forming the employer's work and was not a variation in the ultimate work
the employee was hired to accomplish. Although there are few Texas cases
considering this course of employment problem, it appears that the Texas
courts follow the distinction suggested by Professor Larson between disre-
garding instructions related to the ultimate work to be done (noncompen-
sable) and disregarding instructions related to the method of
accomplishing the ultimate work (compensable).' 23
Unfortunately, the Eastland court of civil appeals disregarded the dis-
tinction noted and applied in the two Brown cases when it decided West-
chester Fire Insurance Co. v. Wendeborn,' 24 noted in the previous section.
The store manager had been drinking and was accidentally shot as he
120. Kilgore v. Fragola, 14 A.D.2d 612, 218 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1961).
121. 131 Tex. 404, 115 S.W.2d 394 (1938). The rule announced by the court was:
While it seems to be the rule that a violation of instructions of an employer by
an employee will not destroy the right to compensation, if the instructions
related merely to the manner of doing work, yet it seems to be held by the
weight of authority that violation of instructions which are intended to limit
the scope of employment will prevent a recovery of compensation.
Id at 409, 115 S.W.2d at 397.
122. 507 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
123. IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, §31.00, at 6-7:
When misconduct involves a prohibited overstepping of the boundaries defin-
ing the ultimate work to be done by the claimant, the prohibited act is outside
the course of employment. But when misconduct involves a violation of regu-
lations or prohibitions relating to method of accomplishing that ultimate work,
the act remains within the course of employment. Violations of express
prohibitions relating to incidental activities, such as seeking personal comfort,
as distinguished from activities contributing directly to the accomplishment of
the main job, are an interruption of the course of employment.
124. 559 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
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handed his shotgun to a friend who had been drinking with him at the
store most of the afternoon and evening. 125 Keeping firearms was a viola-
tion of the employer's rules, although the court specifically noted there was
no "direct evidence that anyone told. . . [the employee] about this rule or
that he was aware of the rule."' 26 Thirty days prior to the fatal accident
shots were fired into the store. After this incident, the decedent kept his
personal shotgun at the store. The court emphasized that the store was in a
secluded area and open late at night; it also focused on the testimony that
there was an increased risk of violent crimes in a secluded area. The court
concluded that the decedent was injured in the course of his employment
because "keeping of the shotgun was incidental to the employment and
performance of the deceased's duties"' 2 7 and the violation of the em-
ployer's rule regarding firearms did not "remove the deceased from the
course and scope of employment."' 128 The court cited, without discussion,
the two Brown cases in support of its holding.
Even an unsophisticated factual and legal analysis of Wendeborn, keep-
ing the Brown cases in mind, indicates that the court erred in awarding
compensation for the employee's death. While the decedent's job descrip-
tion was not provided by the court, it can reasonably be assumed that the
manager's job consisted primarily of stocking and selling various grocery
items carried by the store. Since there was an express prohibition against
guns, it can also be reasonably assumed that the employer did not charge
the employee with the duty to physically protect the store against intrud-
ers. Thus, the employee did not need a firearm to perform his ultimate
employment function of stocking and selling groceries. At the time of his
injury, the employee's activity did not contribute anything to the direct
accomplishment of his duties. Thus, the employee has "stepped outside
the boundaries defining, not his method of working, but the ultimate work
for which he is employed."' 129
Assault by Co-employee. The term "injury" is defined by excluding four
categories of injuries and including all others that originate in the em-
ployer's business while the employee is furthering the employer's affairs.'3 0
One excluded category is injuries caused by personal acts of a third person
not motivated by the employment relationship.' 3 ' This exception has been
interpreted to be applicable to co-employees as well as third persons un-
connected with the employment or the employer.' 32 The exception to this
125. See notes 110-18 supra and accompanying text.
126. 559 S.W.2d at 110. The court's precise usage of the word "direct" makes one won-
der how strong the circumstantial evidence was regarding the decedent's knowledge of the
rule if indeed the evidence was circumstantial to begin with.
127. Id at 11.
128. Id.
129. IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, § 31.14(a), at 6-15 to -16.
130. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
131. Id
132. See, e.g., United States Cas. Co. v Hardie, 299 S.W. 871 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927,
judgmt adopted); Vivier v. Lumbermen's Indem. Exch., 250 S.W. 417 (Tex Comm'n App.
1923, judgmt adopted); Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cheely, 232 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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exception, however, is that an injury arising out of disputes and alterca-
tions over the manner in which the employer's work is performed is com-
pensable, even though the altercation itself is not a part of the work. 33 In
United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Farley34 the court of civil appeals slightly
expanded the co-employee assault rule to include assaults arising out of
arguments over the correct amount of wages to be paid to the employee. 135
B. Compensable Employee
Independent Contractor Versus Employee. An employee 36 is generally
distinguished from an independent contractor by control of or the right to
control the details of the work. 137 The distinction, however, can be diffi-
cult, as illustrated by the court's affirmance of a jury's "employee" finding
in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Bewley. 138
The claimant was the owner of a heavy equipment company, supplying
backhoes, tractors, trenchers, and trucks, with trained operators, to various
construction companies. A backhoe and operator was supplied to Lambert
Construction Company. Lambert was charged a fixed hourly amount
which included the rental for the equipment as well as the fee for the oper-
ator's services. The claimant paid the operator, withholding all applicable
taxes. The court admitted that operating the equipment demanded special
skill and that no one told the claimant or his operator how to operate the
machinery. The court also conceded that the Lambert superintendent
could not terminate the operator without the claimant's consent. On the
other hand, the court listed several factors supporting the claimant's status
as an employee: (1) the claimant did not furnish materials; (2) he could
not come or go at his discretion;' 39 (3) he was paid by the hour, not the job;
Amarillo 1950, writ refd); Associated Employers Lloyds v. Groce, 194 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1946, writ refd n.r.e.); Consolidated Underwriters v. Adams, 140 S.W.2d
221 (Tex. Civ App.-Texarkana 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Mills, 108 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, writ dism'd); Richardson v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 46 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1932, writ ref'd).
133. Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cheely, 232 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950,
writ ref'd). Cheely is the authoritative statement on this area of Texas compensation law.
The opinion is well written and the legal analysis is cogent. Unfortunately, the same
Amarillo court of civil appeals, twenty-three years after Cheey, chose to ignore the Cheely
opinion, the statute, and common sense in rendering their opinion in Insurance Co. of North
America v. Estep, 501 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ refd n.r.e.). The
Estep opinion is reviewed and criticized in Sartwelle, supra note 79, at 204-05.
134. 566 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
135. Id. at 681.
136. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967) defines "employee" as
"every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, expressed or implied, oral
or written."
137. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co v. Wolford, 526 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. 1975); Anchor Cas.
Co. v. Hartsfield, 390 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1965); Newspapers, Inc. v Love, 380 S.W.2d 582
(Tex. 1964); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hooten, 531 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
138. 560 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ). The case was
reversed and remanded because of insufficient evidence on the wage rate issue. See notes
297-300 infra and accompanying text.
139. The court stated this as an undeniable fact even though the undisputed evidence
revealed that the claimant's son had operated the backhoe on the particular job in question.
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(4) he was not furnished with copies of the plans and specifications of the
building under construction; and (5) he did the jobs requested by the con-
tractor that were within the machine's capability. 141
The accident occurred when the claimant, operating the backhoe and
front-end loader in place of his son, who normally operated the equip-
ment, drove the rig into a partially constructed building and struck a joist,
which caused several beams to fall on him. The court of civil appeals,
after reviewing the evidence summarized above, held that "[c]ontradictory
reasonable conclusions can be reached from"' 14 1 the evidence. Thus, the
claimant's status was a jury question.
The court's holding is totally objectionable. Even the claimant, having
been self employed many years, admitted that he had "not been on any-
body's payroll since 1960." 142 The court's five factors allegedly arguing in
favor of employee status are nothing more than an ephemeral judicially
created image. To support the verdict, the court emphasized that the
claimant furnished no material for the project, yet ignored the obvious fact
that he was not in the business of supplying construction materials, only
expensive tractors, graders, backhoes, and front-end loaders, along with a
trained operator who "is a member of a skilled trade."' 43 The court em-
phasized payment by the hour, ignoring the proven fact that the claimant's
usual charge to all customers was "by the hour."' 14 4 The court noted that
the claimant was not able to work his own hours but had to conform to the
hours of Lambert's workers. This comment seems to ignore the evidence,
including the fact that the claimant replaced his son as the operator on
several occasions, including the day of the accident. Moreover, the reali-
ties of construction work dictate that various building phases be completed
chronologically. Thus, with uncertain weather and material delays, heavy
equipment must be available as and when needed. The same is true for
the court's notation that the claimant was not furnished "with the plans
and specifications of the job to be done."' 41 It is doubtful that the claim-
ant needed architectural or engineering plans to perform the excavation
and trash loading work that he performed for Lambert.
The result in this case is exceedingly difficult to understand. It appears
to be another result oriented opinion strongly suggesting that the law is
what the court of civil appeals says it is only because of the limitations on
factual review in the supreme court.'46 It is submitted that had this case
This operator interchangeability by itself would seem to conclusively demonstrate that no
employee-employer relationship existed, such as when the employee has fixed hours and
days of employment and is expected to be at the employer's job every day unless he has a
valid excuse.
140. 560 S.W.2d at 149-50.
141. Id at 150.




146. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1820 (Vernon 1964) provides that the courts of civil
appeals are the final arbiters of "factual" matters.
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arisen on a cause of action asserted by Bewley against Lambert because
Bewley was negligently injured by Lambert's employee (rather than his
own negligence) and Lambert was asserting Bewley to be an employee (ex-
clusiveness of remedy protection) this same court would favor Bewley be-
ing an independent contractor 147 and not an employee.'48
Borrowed Servant. 4 9 A "borrowed servant" is a general employee of one
employer who becomes the special or borrowed servant of another em-
ployer in performing acts on behalf of the latter, such that the borrowing
employer becomes responsible for the workers' injuries and liability.' 5
Although there were two borrowed servant cases decided this year, only
one, Guerrero v. Standard Alloys Manufacturing Co. 1'' is of interest.' 5 2
Guerrero was hired by a contract labor supplier and sent to work on Stan-
147. One other independent contractor versus employee case was decided during this
survey year. In Guzman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 564 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App.- Beau-
mont 1978, no writ), the claimant's primary contention involved the trial court's exclusion of
the carrier's statement of position before the Industrial Accident Board wherein the carrier
admitted that the claimant was an employee of the insured. The court held that the exclu-
sion was proper because the claimant failed to offer proof as to the person's identity and
authority to sign the letter. The court also overruled the claimant's factual points of error
holding there was no evidence to establish that the claimant was an employee of the sub-
scriber. See notes 355-57 infra and accompanying text.
148. A pseudo independent contractor problem was involved in United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Goodson, 568 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
As the court noted, however, the inquiry was not whether the claimant was an employee or
independent contractor because the evidence clearly compelled the conclusion that he was
an employee. The question was whether he was the employee of a subscriber or a nonsub-
scriber. Since the nonsubscriber was hired by the subscriber as an independent contractor
the court's analysis quickly reverted to the typical independent contractor test of the evi-
dence.
Although the evidence clearly indicated that the claimant was never the subscriber's em-
ployee, the court thoroughly discussed all of the evidence as well as the applicable law. In a
very persuasive, well-written opinion, the court concluded that judgment would be rendered
in the subscriber's favor.
149. Last year the supreme court decided Dodd v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 545 S.W.2d
766 (Tex. 1977). In an opinion "devoid of legal principle" the supreme court solved a bor-
rowed servant case by "ignoring established legal principles and past precedence."
Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 339. This year the claimant took his second bite at the apple and
brought a third party suit against the company that appeared to be his actual employer at
the time of the accident, Texas Farm Products. Dodd v. Texas Farm Prods., 567 S.W.2d 919
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ granted). Although the jury returned a verdict favorable
to Dodd, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto,
which was affirmed by the Tyler court of civil appeals. The supreme court has again inter-
vened, however, and granted a writ of error. Dodd v. Texas Farm Prods., 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
65 (Nov. 4, 1978).
150. See J.A. Robinson Sons v. Wigart, 431 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. 1968); Producers Chem.
Co. v. McKay, 366 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1963); Insurors Indem. & Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 148 Tex.
219, 223 S.W.2d 217 (1949); Home Indem. Co. v. Draper, 504 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rotge v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 502 S.W.2d
562 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ).
151. 566 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
152. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Almuina, 571 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978,
writ ref d n.r.e.). This opinion represents no more than an appellate review of the evidence
wherein the court found some evidence to support the jury finding that the claimant was not
a borrowed servant. The factual setting was very similar to Dodd v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.,
545 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1977), in that the two companies involved had some common owner-
ship interest.
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dard Alloys' premises. Pursuant to a contract, Standard Alloys paid the
supplier the hourly wage of all laborers supplied plus thirty percent. The
supplier in turn paid the laborers and withheld applicable taxes and other
deductions.
Guerrero received a hand injury and settled his workers' compensation
claim against the supplier's compensation insurance carrier, but subse-
quently filed a third party suit against Standard Alloys. The trial court
granted Standard Alloys' motion for summary judgment on the theory that
Guerrero was Standard Alloys' employee at the time of the accident since
it had direct supervision and control of his work.
The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial. The
court's opinion is not particularly instructive because it is simply a review
of the summary judgment evidence and its deficiencies. One observation
by the court, however, is noteworthy: "[I]n order to establish an employer-
employee relationship between an employee and a borrowing employer,
the employee must know or be charged with knowledge of the lending
agreement." 15 3
This holding appears insignificant until compared with the supreme
court's holding in JA. Robinson Sons v. Wigart 54 that it is erroneous to
instruct a jury that the borrowed servant must consent to the borrowed
employee relationship. 5' While these holdings appear to conflict, they are
individually correct, although no Texas court has attempted to explain the
harmony. The correctness of each holding arises from the fact that there
can be no workers' compensation liability in the absence of an employer-
employee "contract of hire, expressed or implied, oral or written."' 6
Common law vicarious liability, as pointed out by the Wigar court, con-
cerns only the contractual relationship between the two employers and
which employer controlled or had the right to control the employee. The
employee's rights, as a practical matter, are generally uninvolved in the
typical common law vicarious liability borrowed servant case. Not so,
however, with respect to workers' compensation.
In the compensation arena, the focus of the inquiry is the employee's
contract with the special employer. A contract of hire is, of course, a re-
quirement of the compensation statute 5 7 and must be satisfied before any
person can be classified as one particular employer's employee. If it is
found that the employee consented to an employment relationship with a
special employer, then the test concerning right of control becomes rele-
vant to determine the employer responsible for compensation.
5 8
The Texas courts have never articulated the rationale for requiring em-
153. 566 S.W.2d at 102.
154. 431 S.W.2d 327, 334 (Tex. 1968).
155. While unclear, it seems that the terms consent and knowledge are used interchange-
ably in this context.
156. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967). See IB A. LARSON, supra
note 8, 48.00-.10.
157. VEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
158. The various tests are set forth in the cases cited in note 150 supra.
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ployee consent in borrowed servant compensation cases. According to
Professor Larson, however, the reason is simple:
[T]he employee loses certain rights along with those he gains when he
strikes up a new employment relation. Most important of all, he loses
the right to sue the special employer at common law for negligence;
and when the question has been presented in this form, the courts
have usually been vigilant in insisting upon a showing of a deliberate
and informed consent by the employee before employment relation
will be held a bar to common-law suit.159
This consent requirement, although not formally articulated by Texas
courts, can be traced to Missouri, K & T Railway Co. v. Ferch,'6 ° wherein
the court approved a jury instruction that the employee must consent to a
change in the employment relation, whether the consent was expressed or
implied. Through the years other courts have occasionally made reference
to the employee knowledge requirement,' 6 ' although it has not been uni-
formly recognized as part of a compensation borrowed servant case.'
62
Employee Versus Volunteer. By definition, an employee is a person under
a contract of hire, expressed or implied, oral or written.163 All other per-
sons are excluded from compensation. The key element in distinguishing
an employee from all other persons, including volunteers, is remuneration
of some nature.' This well established principle was reaffirmed by the
Beaumont court in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Burrell. 6
5
The jury found the deceased to have been his son's employee, a finding the
carrier attacked on grounds of legal and factual insufficiency. Burrell was
a full-time Atlantic Richfield employee. On his days off he had, for several
years, helped in his son's logging business, working along side the son's
employees two or three days per week. Although the father received no
cash payment, the son supplied the father with gasoline, parts, and tires.
There was also evidence that the father was working in the son's business
to assure himself a job when he retired from Atlantic Richfield.
The court recognized the applicable case law relating to the issue of re-
159. lB A. LARSON, supra note 8, § 48.10, at 8-206.
160. 44 S.W. 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ refd).
161. Mercury Life & Health Co. v. DeLeon, 314 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1958, writ refd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Neely, 189 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1945, no writ); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Jaques, 131 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.); Chicago, R.I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Trout, 224
S.W. 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1920, writ dism'd).
162. The Pattern Jury Charge Committee has failed to recognize employee knowledge as
a potential issue in a borrowed servant case. The only issue suggested by the Committee
involves the right of control concept. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY
CHARGES § 21.05 (1970 & Supp. 1976). The 1976 supplement suggests no change in the
issue. The cases referred to in the supplement also overlook the employee's consent as being
a possible issue. Id. (Supp. 1976).
163. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
164. See Nobles v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 24 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930,
judgmt adopted); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gilliland, 459 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1970, no writ); Associated Employers Lloyds v. Gibson, 245 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1951, writ dism'd).
165. 564 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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muneration to an employee, holding that the receipt of gasoline, parts, and
tires was some evidence of an employee relationship. In reviewing the en-
tire record as required by the carrier's factual insufficiency point' 66 the
court noted the absence of any compensation agreement between the fa-
ther and son in addition to the fact that the father worked when he
pleased. The court also considered the son's testimony that he did not
consider his father to be an employee and his father did not have to work
in order to "earn" a job upon retirement. Based upon this evidence the
court held the evidence factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
Thus, the case was remanded 67 for new trial.
C. The Claim
Timely Filing of Claim With Industrial Accident Board. To perfect a claim
for compensation, an employee must not only give notice of the injury to
the employer or compensation carrier but must file a compensation claim
with the Industrial Accident Board within six months of the injury. 168 The
employer is required to keep records of all injuries and file a written report
with the Board if an injury causes an employee to be absent from work
more than one day during the first eight days after injury. 169 These provi-
sions did not conflict until the legislature added section 7a of article
8307171 to allow a claimant additional time in which to meet the six month
limitation when the employer fails or neglects to file an injury report as
166. The court used the now familiar In re King's Estate citation in support of the obliga-
tory reference to its duty in passing upon a factual insufficiency point of error. In re King's
Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
167. The court reluctantly remanded the case for new trial, stating: "We realize that
remanding this case may accomplish nothing. However, the appellate court's duty to re-
mand is absolute where there is some evidence, but it is insufficient to support the finding."
564 S.W.2d at 135.
168. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967):
Unless the Association or subscriber have notice of the injury, no proceeding
for compensation for injury under this law shall be maintained unless a notice
of the injury shall have been given to the Association or subscriber within
thirty (30) days after the happening of an injury or the first distinct manifesta-
tion of an occupational disease, and unless a claim for compensation with
respect to such injury shall have been made within six (6) months after the
occurrence of the injury or of the first distinct manifestation of an occupa-
tional disease; or, in case of death of the employee or in the event of his physi-
cal or mental incapacity, within six (6) months after death or the removal of
such physical or mental incapacity. For good cause the Board may, in merito-
rious cases, waive the strict compliance with the foregoing limitations as to
notice, and the filing of the claim before the Board.
169. Id § 7. The pertinent portion of the statute is as follows:
Every subscriber shall hereafter keep a record of all injuries, fatal or other-
wise, sustained by his employees in the course of their employment. Within
eight (8) days after the occurrence of an accident resulting in an injury to an
employee, causing his absence from work for more than one (1) day, or within
eight (8) days after the employee notifies the employer of a definite manifesta-
tion of an occupational disease, a written report thereof shall be made to the
Board on blanks to be procured from the Board for that purpose.
Id
170. Id § 7a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
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required by section 7. Section 7a171 was added in 1971,172 but incredibly
no case arose before this survey year involving the statutes' conflicting pro-
visions. This year the conflict was resolved by not one but two opinions.
In Lowe v. Pacific Employers Indemnity Co. 173 the claimant alleged that
a back injury had occurred in March, 1974, although the claimant missed
no time from work. While advised of the accident within thirty days, the
employer did not file an injury report with the Board. Several months
later (October and November, 1974) the claimant experienced low back
pain and finally underwent surgery. The claimant's notice of injury and
claim for compensation, however, was finally filed with the Board Febru-
ary 11, 1976. The trial court granted the carrier's motion for summary
judgment. The employee conceded that she did not have good cause for
late filing but argued that the six month limitation in section 7a did not
begin to run because the employer, concededly notified of the accident,
failed or refused to file an injury notice as section 7 requires. Thus, she
argued, section 7a tolled the six month filing limitation and her claim was
not barred because the six month limitation never began to run.
The Dallas court, affirming the take-nothing judgment, construed sec-
tion 7 to require an employer to file an accident report with the Board only
if the injured employee had been absent from work for more than one day
out of the first eight days following the accident. The court noted: "No
provision is made for a report if the employee is not absent from work
until after the expiration of the eight-day period."' 74 Section 7a operates
to extend the six month time period, the court held, only when the em-
ployer is required to file a section 7 report. Since the employee was not
absent more than one day in the first eight following the accident, the em-
ployer was under no section 7 duty to file an injury report and the provi-
sions of section 7a were inapplicable.
As a parting comment, the court noted that the compensation reporting
and filing requirements were designed to prevent assertion of stale claims
and provide for prompt investigation of accidents, the same as with any
statute of limitation. A claim such as the claimant asserted, wherein she
believed the injury to be minor until many months later, would be pro-
tected by the good cause provision allowing late filing of claims. The only
benefit a late maturing injury claimant would not have would be the addi-
tional time provided by section 7a. In view of the liberal interpretation of
171. Section 7a provides:
Where the association or subscriber has been given notice or the association or
subscriber has knowledge of an injury or death of an employee and fails, ne-
glects, or refuses to file a report thereof as required by the provisions of Sec-
tion 7 of this Article, the limitation in Section 4a of this Article in respect to
the filing of a claim for compensation shall not begin to run against the claim
of the injured employee or his dependents entitled to compensation, or in
favor of either the association or subscriber until such report shall have been
furnished as required by Section 7 of this Article.
Id.
172. Id
173. 559 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
174. Id at 372.
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good cause, however, it is submitted that late maturing injuries do not
need more.
The second case involving section 7a was Robicheaux v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. 17' The claimant asserted the same argument asserted in
Lowe. The Houston [14th District] court adopted Lowe's statutory inter-
pretation in its entirety, affirming the trial court's take-nothing judg-
ment. 176
Third Party Suit-Subrogation. The statutory scheme encompassing the
rights to collect damages from third parties responsible for injuries to
workers was revised in 1973 when the legislature amended section 6a of
article 8307.177 Contrary to the pre-1973 law, the amended statute pro-
vides that an employee may simultaneously pursue his compensation
claim and any potential third party action or pursue one to conclusion and
then assert the other without waiving any rights he may have with respect
to either claim. 7 8 The question arose, however, whether the carrier is en-
titled to an offset or credit for sums recovered in third party suits if the
employee pursued the third party action prior to the compensation action.
The answer was provided this year in Granite State Insurance Co. v.
Firebaugh. 179
Firebaugh lost the sight of an eye in an automobile accident. He was a
member of an oil well drilling crew and was on the way to the rig at the
175. 562 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ).
176. Three "good cause" cases were decided during the survey year but added nothing
significant to the law of good cause other than three more individual fact situations.
Lewis v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 563 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ
ref d n.r.e.), involved, amazingly enough, a summary judgment for the carrier on the issue of
good cause affirmed on appeal. The fact situation will probably never be repeated, and the
carrier's summary judgment proof must be read to be believed.
Miles v. Commercial Ins. Co., 568 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ),
involved a jury finding favorable to the carrier on the issue of 30 day reporting. The court
reviewed all of the evidence and in a questionable holding remanded the case for new trial
because the jury's finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
In a lengthy opinion, minutely reviewing and analyzing the evidence, the Corpus Christi
court upheld a jury's good cause finding favorable to the claimant in Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Herron, 569 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ). The
claimant's good cause excuse involved his reliance upon the company to file a claim, such
belief being fostered by periodic compensation payments and verbal assurances from a vice
president who also happened to be a personal friend.
177. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
178. Id. The pertinent portion of the statute provides:
Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this law was
caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other
than the subscriber to pay damages in respect thereof, the employee may pro-
ceed either at law against that person to recover damages or against the associ-
ation for compensation under this law, and if he proceeds at law against the
person other than the subscriber, then he shall not be held to have waived his
rights to compensation under this law.
Id
In view of the allowance of simultaneous suits, it has been held that the two year statute of
limitation applicable to the third party suit begins to run on the date of the claimant's injury.
Burkhart v. Concho Indus. Supply, Inc., 549 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no
writ). See Campbell v. SonfordChem. Co., 486 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1972).
179. 558 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
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time of the accident. The automobile in which the employee was a passen-
ger was being driven by the driller, Tipton, who was apparently paid by
the employer to furnish transportation to and from the well site for mem-
bers of his drilling crew. The employer's compensation carrier, Granite
State, denied liability, contending that the claimant was not in the course
of employment.' The claimant filed a claim against Tipton alleging that
his negligence caused both the accident and resulting injuries. Tipton's
automobile insurance carrier settled the claim for $12,500.00, the claimant
executing a general release. The employee then asserted his compensation
claim against Granite State, recovering compensation benefits without any
offset or credit for the third party settlement.
The Eastland court thoroughly explored the history and philosophy be-
hind the subrogation statute, quoting liberally from various venerable
cases. The court's holding and its reasoning for rendering judgment in the
carrier's favor is best summed up by quoting part of the opinion's last par-
agraph:
[W]e hold the claimant may not be permitted to pursue to conclu-
sion a third party claim and then seek workmen's compensation with-
out accountability to the carrier for sums recovered. To hold
otherwise would render totally ineffective the other sections of section
6a as amended and permit a double recovery by the employee.' 8 '
The court's holding in Firebaugh is in keeping with the philosophy ex-
pressed by a majority of jurisdictions confronting the reimbursement is-
sue.'8 2 That philosophy allows the loss associated with an injury to fall
upon the ultimate wrongdoer, if that wrongdoer is not a part of the com-
pensation system that assumes financial responsibility for the injured
worker. The concomitant philosophy is that the employee should reim-
burse the employer out of the third party recovery rather than receive the
benefits of a compensation recovery and a tort recovery for the same in-
jury. In this manner the employer, who is normally innocent of wrongdo-
ing, is reimbursed, the employee is made whole, and the guilty third party
is made to pay for the loss he has caused.8 3 In fact, however, the imple-
mentation of the entire third party scheme is nothing more than a series of
temporary bookkeeping entries until the ultimate "wrongdoer" is reim-
bursed by passing the cost on to the public. By the time this supposed
wrongdoer is reimbursed, however, the cost of the original injury has been
multiplied many fold because of the increasing expense factor associated
with each step up the litigation ladder. Thus, it is the public that pays for
the ever more expensive third party "fault" philosophy that has as its only
quest the pursuit, capture, and punishment of the ultimate "wrongdoer."
180. Based upon three recent opinions in factually analogous cases, this contention was
not viable. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Adams, 555 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Byrd, 540 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chesnut, 539 S.W.2d 924
(Tex. Civ. App. -El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
181. 558 S.W.2d at 553.
182. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 8, §§ 71.00-.30.
183. d
1979]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
The focus of this philosophy, which is solely on the wrongdoer's capture, is
in need of refraction. The focus should be upon the rehabilitation of the
injured worker. If the assets devoted to third party actions and the pursuit
of the ephemeral "wrongdoer" were channeled into the compensation sys-
tem in the form of increased benefits and increased rehabilitation and re-
training, the problems surrounding industrial injuries could be resolved
and the system modernized, streamlined, and made many times more effi-
cient.
A prime example of the waste often associated with the third party
scheme is the negligence claim made by Firebaugh against his fellow em-
ployee who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. In spite of
article 8306, section 3, which provides that an employee has no cause of
action for personal injuries against his employer or "against any agent,
servant or employee of said employer,"' 4 Firebaugh was allowed to col-
lect from a co-employee a substantial sum as damages for personal inju-
ries. Firebaugh's windfall results from judicial sleight of hand used to
create the impression that the courts have arrived at a rational, reasonable
result, when in fact the result is nothing more or less than raw resultism.
As construed by the supreme court in McKelvy v. Barber,'8 5 an article
8306, section 3 employee is one "for whose conduct the employer would,
aside from the Workmen's Compensation Act, be legally responsible
under the doctrine of respondeat superior."'816 Thus, as in Ward v.
Wright, i8 7 when two employees' automobiles collided while maneuvering
to exit the employer's parking lot to go to lunch, the aggrieved employee is
allowed to sue the employee "wrongdoer" because the wrongdoer is not in
the course of employment for liability purposes, Z e., the employer is not
legally liable by the doctrine of respondeat superior. Even more incredi-
ble, however, is the fact that both employees are entitled to collect full
compensation benefits from the employer because of the broad interpreta-
tion given to the term "employer's premises," as well as the liberal defini-
tion of "course of employment" in compensation cases which includes the
employee's going and coming as long as he is on the premises, as in Weaver
v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. 188 Thus, the logical conclusion of a simple
employee parking lot accident is complicated, costly litigation.
Assume two employees leave the employer's parking lot at the end of the
184. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967):
The employees of a subscriber and the parents of minor employees shall have
no right o action against their employer or against any agent, servant or em-
ployee of said employer for damages for personal injuries, and the representa-
tives and beneficiaries of deceased employees shall have no right of action
against such subscribing employer or his agent, servant or employee for dam-
ages for injuries resulting in death, but such employees and their representa-
tives and beneficiaries shall look for compensation solely to the association, as
the same is hereinafter provided for.
185. 381 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1964).
186. Id at 62.
187. 490 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no writ).
188. 567 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.). See
notes 15-60 supra and accompanying text.
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workday. Employee "Do Wrong" hits employee "Do Right" from the
rear, injuring both. The litigation picture would be as follows. Both Do
Right and Do Wrong claim compensation which the carrier disputes both
as to course of employment and extent and duration. Both claims are ap-
pealed to the district court and tried to jury. At the same time Do Right
sues Do Wrong to collect common law damages. Do Wrong's insurance
carrier also disputes liability and extent and duration. The compensation
carrier intervenes in the common law suit to assert its subrogation interest.
The suit is also tried to a jury. If everyone recovers on all causes of action,
Do Right has collected workers' compensation, less attorney's fees and ex-
penses, held that money temporarily, and then repaid those benefits to the
compensation insurance carrier, less more attorney's fees and more ex-
penses, when Do Wrong's liability carrier paid the common law damage
judgment. Do Wrong has collected compensation benefits less attorney's
fees and expenses. The compensation carrier has recovered part of its pay-
ments less attorney's fees and expenses. The employer has gained nothing
except an increased compensation premium which it passes on to the con-
sumer as Do Wrong's liability insurance carrier passes on its loss when it
asks the Insurance Board for a rate increase. Surely there must be a phi-
losophy of compensation which emphasizes efficiency and cost conscious-
ness which would work as well or better than the pursuit of the
"wrongdoer" philosophy which has been blindly pursued for so many
years. 189
Causation. In recent years the supreme court has diligently chopped away
at the formerly required medical testimony standard of "reasonable medi-
cal probability." Today the only requirement necessary to prove causal
connection appears to be a hired testifier willing to engage in surmise, sus-
picion, and speculation. 9 ° The El Paso court of civil appeals, however,
still requires at least some semblance of "reasonable medical probability"
to connect the alleged event with the resulting injury.' 9 ' In Texas Employ-
ers' Insurance Association v. Stodghill'9 2 the employee fell from a drilling
189. If the "wrongdoer" philosophy is to be continued then it would seem to be more
satisfactory to solve employee versus employee suits by using the regular workers' compen-
sation course of employment standard. As Professor Larson observes: "After all, there are
troubles and complications enough administering one course of employment test under the
act, without adding a second. By adopting the compensation test, a court has at hand a
ready-made body of cases with which to dispose of most borderline situations." 2A A. LAR-
SON, supra note 8, § 72.20, at 14-43.
190. Lucas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 552 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1977), reviewed in
Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 357-60; Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gonzales, 518 S.W.2d 524
(Tex. 1975), reviewed in Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
30 Sw. L.J. 213, 222-24 (1976); Griffin v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 450 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.
1969); see Steakley, Expert Medical Testimony in Texas, I ST. MARY'S L.J. 161 (1969).
191. This same insistence on more than mere guess, speculation, surmise, and suspicion
was not demonstrated by the Texarkana court of civil appeals when it concluded that a
jury's common experience and knowledge was sufficient to decide if a particular movement
of a man's body was sufficient to produce an inguinal hernia. Northern Assurance Co. of
America v. Taylor, 540 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
reviewed in Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 359-60.
192. 570 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ filed).
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rig, suffering multiple but not life-threatening injuries. Exactly forty-seven
days later, he suffered a fatal heart attack. The treating physician testified
that the injury and the heart attack were unrelated. The widow produced
a physician witness who had never treated the employee. He testified,
based upon the medical and hospital records, that the initial accident ag-
gravated a pre-existing hypertension condition. He was then asked
whether the injury hastened the employee's death. The response, quoted
by the court, was utterly unintelligible. 9 3 Convinced that the widow's
causation testimony did not meet a reasonable medical probability stand-
ard, the El Paso court sustained the carrier's no evidence point of error and
reversed and rendered judgment that the widow take nothing.' 94 The El
Paso court, in attempting to require a reasonable modicum of medical evi-
dence on the causation issue, is probably not in step with the supreme
court's recent holdings'95 which encourage plaintiffs to seek out a doctor
willing to stretch credibility to the absolute limit of propriety in order to
gamble on a favorable jury verdict. Although the El Paso court may well
be tilting with windmills in its effort to return a degree of sanity to causa-
tion testimony, its jousting has created a refreshing breath of air. 196
Wrongful Discharge or Discrimination. Article 8307c provides that an em-
ployer may not discharge or in any manner discriminate against an em-
ployee because the employee files a compensation claim, hires an attorney
to represent him, or testifies in any compensation proceeding. 9 This stat-
ute has been held to be inapplicable to public employees included within
the coverage of article 8309h'98 because the legislature failed to designate
193. "Q. If you assumed the things that show in the record, and that I have
asked you to assume about his history, is there any question in your mind but
what the injury that he got in April hastened his death?
"THE WITNESS: I have a strong belief that a man that has been injured, a
man of this age, 49 years old with a previous history of arterial hypertension,
and had been involved in an accident, any kind of accident which produced a
bodily injury, will trigger any complication in hypertension, and basis-and
the cause of death or death. The same thing that could be if a heart failure,
could be renal failure, a blood clot, miocardial [sic] infarction; anything could
be the fault, of it, but the main thing here, the man was injured, and the injury
could produce probably some kind of shortening of the life span."
Id. at 400.
194. The rendition was accomplished with great difficulty. The carrier's points of error
were not entirely correct with respect to the proper procedural predicates. Nevertheless, the
court, after a lengthy discussion of appellate procedure, determined that rendition was in-
deed proper. See id at 401-04.
195. See cases cited at note 190 supra.
196. The Amarillo court in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Villasana, 558 S.W.2d 917
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ), followed the supreme court's writing in Western
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gonzales, 518 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. 1975), holding that its review of the
medical testimony revealed that the substance of the testimony established a "reasonable
probability of causal connection" between injury and the alleged disability. 558 S.W.2d at
920.
197. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
198. Id art. 8309h.
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that statute as one applicable to public employees. 199 In Thompson v. Mon-
santo Co., 2  a case of first impression, the question was whether substan-
tive federal law, the Taft-Hartley Act, 20 ' preempted the field of labor
policy to the exclusion of a state remedy once the employee chose to exer-
cise his rights under federal law.212 The suit resulted following the em-
ployee's spinal injuries for which he received total, permanent benefits.
Monsanto terminated the employee, who then filed a grievance alleging
that he had been terminated for pursuing his compensation claim and re-
covering a favorable verdict. The arbiter found the discharge justified be-
cause the employee's injuries prevented the safe performance of any job
within his classification and seniority. The collective bargaining agree-
ment provided that the arbiter's decision was final and binding. Thus,
Monsanto defended the article 8307c suit on the ground that the employee
was estopped to assert the suit since he elected to pursue arbitration. The
employee argued, however, that arbitration could not divest a Texas court
of the jurisdiction conferred by article 8307c and thereby deprive him of a
legal determination of his claim.
The court of civil appeals, thoroughly reviewing the extensive judicial
writing and analyzing the complex competing factors involved in the inter-
action between federal and state law, concluded that, where applicable,
federal law preempted state law on the labor versus management issue.
The court did note, however, two exceptions to the rule requiring an em-
ployee to abide by the collective bargaining agreement. One exception is if
the union wrongfully refuses to pursue the claim through arbitration, then
the employee may look to the courts for relief and not be subject to the
defense of failure to exhaust contractual remedies. The other recognized
exception is one created by the Supreme Court's holding in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. 203 that an employee can bring a racial discrimination
suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 2°4 even after submitting
to final arbitration.215 In Thompson the employee did not complain of the
union's failure to represent him nor did he complain of discrimination.
199. Gates v. City of Fort Worth, 567 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978,
writ refd n.r.e.).
200. 559 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
201. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
202. The court may have overlooked a recent opinion apparently involving a similar
issue. In Brown v. Brookside Div. of Safeway Stores, Inc., 517 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1974, no writ), the employee alleged wrongful discharge. It is not specifically
stated in the opinion that the cause of action is based on art. 8307c, but this would be the
logical assumption. Nevertheless, the employer's motion for summary judgment was
granted. The employer argued that the employee failed to comply with the terms of a writ-
ten contract between his union and the employer and, therefore, he had failed to exhaust his
contractual remedies thereby making the suit premature.
The court of civil appeals affirmed. The summary judgment evidence disclosed that the
employee had been terminated for absenteeism and had filed a grievance which was denied.
The labor contract provided for arbitration but none was ever requested. The court held
that the contract was the employee's exclusive method for redress and failure to exhaust the
grievance procedure barred the maintenance of a suit to litigate the same controversy.
203. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
205. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has also held that arbitration
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Thus, the court held that the trial court properly sustained the employer's
affirmative defense of final arbitration.
Section 12c-Contribution of Prior and Subsequent Injuries. Section 12c of
article 8306206 has undergone a legislative metamorphosis in the past sev-
eral years. Current section 12c is a verbatim resurrection of the original
section 12c adopted in 1917207 and readopted in 1947 when the Second
Injury Fund became law.2°8 In theory section 12c reduces a carrier's lia-
bility for a present incapacity if the incapacity is contributed to by a previ-
ously existing incapacity. For reasons which cannot be fathomed, the
courts have judicially rewritten section 12c to suit their own purposes in
each individual case.2 9 The legislature briefly interrupted the courts' hy-
perbolic debasement of section 12c when, in 1971, it amended the section
to provide that a carrier would no longer be entitled to have a prior inca-
pacity considered as a possible reduction of liability for a present incapac-
ity, but rather would be liable for all compensation due for the combined
effects of both incapacities.
210
From 1971 to 1977, when section 12c was returned to its pre-1971 ver-
sion, the courts unanimously interpreted section 12c to mean exactly what
the legislature had written, i e., the carrier could no longer offer proof of a
prior injury to reduce the employee's recovery for a present incapacity.2
Although the 1971 change in the wording of section 12c was seemingly
insignificant, the economic impact on the compensation system was noted
to be of major proportion.212 In analyzing the operation of the 1971 ver-
sion of section 12c, it was also noted that it was theoretically possible for a
worker to be injured on the same job five days in a row and collect five
total and permanent verdicts.2 3 The hypothetical example was only
slightly exaggerated in order to make the point. There is now available an
example which unfortunately is neither an exaggeration nor hypothetical.
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Graves2 14 the jury found the employee
totally and permanently incapacitated as a result of a July, 1973 injury and
a January, 1975 injury, both incapacities beginning on January 4, 1975.
The trial court entered judgment for total permanent benefits for each in-
jury. The court of civil appeals affirmed.
would not preclude review by the National Labor Relations Board, citing Carey v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964). 559 S.W.2d at 876.
206. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (adopted in
1977).
207. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 103, at 269-94.
208. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 349, § 1, at 690-91.
209. See Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 304-34.
210. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 316, § 1, at 1257.
211. Second Injury Fund v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Teague, 531 S.W.2d 457
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Haunschild,
527 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Creswell, 511 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
212. Sartwelle, supra note 190, at 237-39.
213. Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 305.
214. No. 1289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi, Oct. 19, 1978, writ filed).
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The court rejected the carrier's first contention that two awards could
not be rendered when the separate incapacities began on the same day.
Although the opinion does not refute the carrier's argument, it is not meri-
torious under current Texas compensation law. The definition of total in-
215capacity, as interpreted by the appellate courts, means that an employee
may be totally and permanently incapacitated even if after an injury he
continues to work at the same job for higher wages than he received before
the injury.2 6 Thus, the fact that the claimant continued to work during
the period between the occurrence of his first and second injuries was not a
sufficient reason to deny compensation or overturn a jury verdict. There is
nothing in current Texas compensation theory except common sense which
denies a worker compensation for two concurrent disabilities resulting
from two separate injuries.217
The carrier's second argument was that the 1971 version of section 12c
did not apply because the employee did not sustain a prior compensable
injury as section 12c requires and thus section 12c was inapplicable. No
prior compensable injury existed because the Act2 8 requires incapacity to
exist for at least one week after an injury occurs before the injury becomes
compensable. Since there was no incapacity until after the second injury,
the first injury was not a prior compensable injury as required to make
section 12c applicable. The court disposed of this argument by noting that
no court had ever held that the prior injury referred to in section 12c had
to be a compensable injury before the second injury occurred. Neverthe-
less, the court freely admitted that the result, while unavoidable, allowed
the claimant an undeserved double recovery. Thus, as previously pre-
dicted,21 9 the court was compelled to allow the claimant a windfall.
In a factual setting similar to Graves, the Eastland court of civil appeals
made a remarkable holding partially limiting the recovery obtainable by a
worker with separate general injuries. In Texas General Indemnity Co. v.
Lee22° the claimant's first back injury occurred in December, 1973 and the
second, while working for the same employer, occurred in October, 1975.
215. The definition submitted by most trial courts is found in 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES § 22.02 (1970).
216. This proposition is so well established and has been written by so many courts that
no citation is really necessary to support this statement. For the sake of form, however, a
reference will be made to a normally dubious secondary authority which just happens to
correctly cite a good many of the cases supporting the statement. 63 TEX. JUR. 2d Work-
men's Compensation § 140 (1965 & Supp. 1978).
217. The incapacities can be limited only by the artificial 401 week limitation on total
permanent disability benefits. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 10 (Vernon Supp.
1978-79). This limitation may provide another limit to full benefits in a case involving a so-
called delayed disability such as in Graves. This limitation would result from the fact that
the 401 weeks begin with the date of injury and not incapacity. Id; Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.
America v. Williams, 129 Tex. 51, 99 S.W.2d 905 (1937); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
White, 129 Tex. 659, 99 S.W.2d 904 (1937); Jones v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 128 Tex.
437, 99 S.W.2d 903 (1937); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Guidry, 128 Tex. 433, 99 S.W.2d
900 (1937).
218. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 6 (Vernon 1967).
219. See note 212 supra and accompanying text.
220. 570 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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The claimant filed two separate claims for total, permanent incapacity.
The first trial involved the October, 1975 injury. The claimant recovered
total, permanent lump sum benefits. The second trial, involving the De-
cember, 1973 injury, also resulted in an award of total, permanent lump
sum benefits. On appeal, the carrier argued that the claimant was judi-
cially estopped to recover total permanent benefits from the December,
1973 injury because of his testimony in the first trial. The claimant's testi-
mony in the first trial, quoted at length by the court,22' was in essence that
his incapacity at the time of the first trial was total and permanent and
caused completely by the October, 1975 injury.
The court observed that judicial estoppel merely bars a party who has
made a sworn statement in the course of a judicial proceeding from later
taking a contrary position, unless the statement is made inadvertently or
by mistake, fraud, or duress. In the second trial the claimant asserted that
he was totally, permanently incapacitated as a result of the 1973 injury
which was contrary to the testimony in the first trial. Thus, the court held
that the claimant was estopped to assert total, permanent disability arising
out of the 1973 injury but could assert a claim for temporary incapacity.
Of course, temporary incapacity includes temporary, total incapacity
which could last at least 401 weeks. Thus, while the carrier may have won
the battle, the war still hangs in the balance.222
221. Id at 233-34.
222. Two other cases also involved the issue of prior injuries. In New York Underwrit-
ers Ins. Co. v. Upshaw, 560 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ), the
insurance carrier complained that the trial court would not permit cross-examination of the
claimant regarding several prior back injuries. The court noted that the case was governed
by the 1971 version of § 12c which precluded the use of prior injuries to offset liability for a
present incapacity. Thus, the prior injuries that the carrier sought to prove were applicable
to a sole cause issue only. The record, according to the court, did not reveal that the carrier
attempted to connect the prior injuries to sole cause. Thus, the exclusion of the prior injuries
was not error and the court affirmed the judgment.
In Presley v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 557 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no
writ), the jury failed to find that the claimant sustained an accidental injury. The claimant
complained that the trial court had given a sole cause instruction which somehow induced
the jury to negatively answer the accidental injury issue. The court summarily overruled the
contention as well as several others affirming the trial court's take-nothing judgment.
There are two interesting aspects to the Presley case. The first is the fact that the carrier
a pparently made a movie showing the claimant working very diligently in connection with
the landscaping business that he operated. This is one of the few cases where the stereo-
typed image of the big powerful insurance company using millions of dollars to investigate
one poor little claimant is perhaps half truth. In this case, however, it apparently worked.
The second interesting aspect is the trial court instruction on the sole cause issue raised by
the claimant's previous injury. Since TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 outlaws inferential rebuttal issues,
sole cause must be submitted as part of an instruction. The instruction quoted by the court
in Presley appears to be a correct instruction and one that can readily be understood and
applied by a jury. The instruction reads:
"You are instructed that if an employee has suffered a previous on the job
injury and suffers a subsequent on the job injury which resulted in a condition
of incapacity to which both injuries or their effects have contributed, you shall
consider the combined effects of the injuries in determining whether or not the
employee has sustained any total and/or partial disability. On the other hand,
if you find that the defendant has established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the injury of May, 1969, was the sole cause of the present alleged
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Suits to Mature Awards. In Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Cortez2 2 3 the
supreme court allowed death benefits to be "accelerated" and paid in a
lump sum despite the legislature's specific, plain, unambiguous directive
that death benefits shall be paid weekly and not in a lump sum. Since the
legislature is in session this year, one can only hope that this unfortunate
judicial rewriting of the Act can be rectified by a specific amendment clari-
fying the legislature's intent.
The Industrial Accident Board awarded Anita Cortez and her six minor
children death benefits. The payments were to be made weekly. The at-
torneys' fee portion of the award was paid in a lump sum pursuant to the
parties' agreement and the Board's approval. The carrier made weekly
payments for fifteen months. Due to a bookkeeping error, no payments
were made between June 14 and July 25, 1976. The widow filed suit to
mature the Board's award and to accelerate the death benefits into a lump
sum payment as well as to collect a twelve percent penalty and attorney's
fees. Neither Mrs. Cortez nor her attorneys ever contacted the insurance
company regarding the resumption of the payments.224 Upon learning of
the filing of suit, however, the company immediately issued drafts for the
seven delinquent weekly payments and continued to tender weekly drafts
until the date of trial, but Mrs. Cortez refused to accept payment.
The trial judge found that even though the payments were stopped be-
cause of mere clerical oversight, that did not justify the payment stoppage.
Thus, the trial court matured the entire claim based upon the widow's 27.6
year life expectancy, allowed no discount for present payment, assessed a
twelve percent penalty, and awarded attorneys' fees.225 The court of civil
appeals affirmed.226
The trial court's judgment was based upon article 8307, section 5a,22 7
incapacity, then you may not find that the alleged injury of February, 1974,
was a producing cause of any alleged incapacity."
557 S.W.2d at 613.
223. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 156 (Dec. 20, 1978).
224. The supreme court's majority opinion conveniently left out this fact along with the
fact that drafts were tendered each week until the date of trial. These facts are noted in the
court of civil appeals' opinion. 562 S.W.2d 940, 942-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978).
225. The supreme court opinion provides none of this information. The court of civil
appeals' opinion, however, recites that judgment was rendered for $90,417.60, being $63.00
per week for 1,435.2 weeks (Mrs. Cortez's 27.6 year life expectancy), without discount, a 12%
penalty of $10,850.11, and attorney's fees of $37,139.20 subject to a $7,000.00 remittitur if no
appeal was perfected to the court of civil appeals and a $3,500.00 remittitur if no appeal was
taken to the supreme court. Id at 943.
226. Id
227. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5a (Vernon 1967). This section provides, in
pertinent part as follows:
Where the board has made an award against an association requiring the
payment to an injured employd or his beneficiaries of any weekly or monthly
payments, under the terms of this law, and such association should thereafter
fail or refuse, without justifiable cause, to continue to make said payments
promptly as they mature, then the said injured employ6 or his beneficiaries, in
case of his death, shall have the right to mature the entire claim and to insti-
tute suit thereon to collect the full amount thereof, together with twelve per
cent penalties and attorney's fees, as herein provided for.
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which provides that if the carrier fails or refuses to make weekly or
monthly payments as required, then the claimant, or in a death case, the
beneficiaries, may sue to mature the entire award and collect a twelve per-
cent penalty plus attorneys' fees. The carrier contended that an award of a
future lump sum was impermissible in a death case because article 8306,
section 8 specifically provides for payments to beneficiaries and attorneys
to be periodic and not in a lump sum except in the event of remarriage or
when there is a bona fide dispute as to the carrier's liability for the
death.228
The majority opinion is almost impossible to analyze because a careful
study reveals that a substantial portion of the opinion does not relate to the
substantive, practical issue involved in the case. That issue, in simple
terms, is how does a court mature death benefits when the benefits payable
to the widow and children are uncertain and incapable of being ascer-
tained with any degree of certainty.229 The majority opinion failed to dis-
cuss this question, other than to agree with the trial court's judgment as to
the lump sum amount, although the majority did allow a four percent dis-
count on the matured award. Thus, the case was remanded to the district
court "for the entry of a judgment in accordance with this opinion. ,230
The only recognition the majority gave to the indefinite nature of a
death award was to observe that the statute allowed lump sum awards in
cases of bona fide disputes as to liability. Thus, according to the majority:
The Legislature itself . . . specifically allows original lump sum
awards when there is a bona fide dispute as to liability. Thus, even in
228. Id art. 8306, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). The statute provides:
(b) The weekly benefits payable to the widow or widower of a deceased
employee shall be continued until the death or remarriage of the beneficiary.
In the event of remarriage a lump sum payment equal in amount to the bene-
fits due for a period of two (2) years shall be paid to the widow or widower.
The weekly benefits payable to a child shall be continued until the child
reaches eighteen (18) years of age, or beyond such age if actually dependent,
or until twenty-five (25) years of age if enrolled as a full-time student in any
accredited educational institution. All other legal beneficiaries are entitled to
weekly benefits for a period of three hundred and sixty (360) weeks.
(c) Upon the termination of the eligibility of any child to receive benefits,
the portion of compensation paid to such child shall thereafter be paid to any
remaining child or children entitled to benefits under the provisions of this
Act. If there is no other eligible child then such benefits shall be added to
those being paid to the surviving spouse entitled to receive benefits under the
provisions of this Act.
(d) The benefits payable to a widow, widower, or children under this sec-
tion shall not be paid in a lump sum except in events of remarriage or in case
of bona fide disputes as to the liability of the association for the death. Any
settlement of a disputed case shall be approved by the board or court only
upon an express finding that a bona fide dispute exists as to such liability.
Upon settlement of all cases where the carrier admits liability for the death
but a dispute exists as to the proper beneficiary or beneficiaries, the settlement
shall be paid in periodic payments as provided by the law, with a reasonable
attorney's fee not to exceed twenty-five per cent (25%) of the settlement. The
attorney's fee shall be paid periodically and not in a lump sum.
Id
229. Id
230. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 159.
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original proceedings, both the Board and the courts may face the
problem of calculating an award based on the life and remarriage ex-
pectancy of a widow or widower. The means of calculating the re-
marriage expectancy of a widow or widower admittedly create
problems for the Board and for the courts. Nevertheless, the Legisla-
ture has expressly provided that lump sums of death benefits may be
awarded when liability is disputed and has given no indication of an
intent to abolish the right to a lump sum award under the enforce-
ment statute. The fact that the Legislature has provided no specific
guidelines for calculating remarriage expectancy in the event of a
lump sum award is no basis for refusing to award a lump sum when
the propriety of such an award is specifically provided for by the Act.
. . . The Legislature will soon be in session; and if this opinion does
not comport with its intent, it may, of course, clarify the matter.23 ,
This challenge to the legislature ignores a very practical problem of de-
termining, for example, the lump sum to be paid to a widow or widower so
old as to have no life expectancy according to a published table. More-
over, the majority ignores the obvious fact that a settlement when there is a
bona fide dispute as to liability is not a settlement of a weekly obligation
extending into the future but rather a legislatively authorized lump sum
settlement of the disputed liability for the death. The law encourages set-
tlements and the legislature provided for a lump sum settlement in dis-
puted cases rather than dictating that the parties "roll the dice" and go for
all or nothing.
The minority opinion, written by Justice Barrow,232 pointed out that the
legislative provision for lifetime death benefits was designed to replace the
wages of the deceased wage earner. Except in two narrowly defined and
precise instances, the legislature commanded that benefits be payable in
weekly amounts. This legislative intent was clearly illustrated by the fact
that the legislature provided no means to determine the amount of any
future benefits. As to life expectancy, remarriage, and children, the dissent
noted:
Life expectancy tables, although not mentioned in the statute, do give
a guide for the life expectancy of a surviving spouse. However, there
probably is nothing more uncertain than the chances of, or the time
for, the remarriage of a widow or widower. Furthermore, as long as
there are minor children there is a possibility that one child might
become dependent and thus entitled to benefits for the balance of that
dependent child's life. A prior lump sum payment would deprive that
child of benefits it otherwise would receive. 233
As to how the statutes could be harmonized, the dissent wrote:
I agree wholeheartedly with the legislative intent of Article 8307,
section 5a, that the association should be penalized for failing to make
the weekly payments on time. However, if the 12% penalty on the
231. Id. at 158.
232. Id. at 159-61 (dissenting opinion by Barrow, J., joined by Steakley, Pope, & Daniel,
J.J,).
233. Id at 160.
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weekly payments which were not timely paid plus reasonable attor-
ney's fees is not an adequate penalty, the legislature should amend the
statute to increase the penalty. I do not believe we should attempt to
do so by a judicial construction of the death benefits statute contrary
to the expressed intent of the legislature in Article 8306, section 8. I
would limit the penalty and attorney's fee to the weekly payment ben-
efits which were not timely paid by petitioner.3
The dissenting opinion is without question the only logical approach to
the construction and harmonizing of the statutes. The difficulty with the
majority's approach to the construction of these statutes becomes most
painfully obvious when considered in light of the dissent's observations
regarding the uncertainty not only of remarriage but more importantly the
benefits destined for a minor child or children, benefits that are simply
ignored and voided by the majority holding. For example, when the trial
court apportioned the Cortez judgment, was it assumed that the six minor
children would not attend college? If so, each child's participation would
terminate at age eighteen, even though the legislature has provided for
continued payments to each child enrolled as a full time college student.
Suppose one or more of the six minor children should become a
quadriplegic, paraplegic, or mental handicap and thus dependent upon the
mother for support for the rest of its life. This child or these children have
been cut off from funds which would continue to be paid to them without
regard to the mother's life expectancy. If the mother has frittered away the
lump sum award, the child may become another public charge. What
would occur if the widow or widower outlives the trial court's life expec-
tancy estimate? Does the widow or widower have a right to make the car-
rier reinstitute payments? Perhaps there would be a cause of action against
the district judge who calculated, or rather miscalculated, the amount of
the judgment.
Lump Sum Awards. Fortunately, at least at this writing, the district
courts' ability to prognosticate with certainty will only be tested in a suit to
mature an award and, according to one court, awarding lump sum attor-
neys' fees. The Beaumont court wisely rejected the opportunity to engage
in perilous speculation in Walden v. Royal Globe Insurance Co. 235 In
Walden the accrued weekly payments were ordered paid with interest and
the future benefits paid weekly. The claimant appealed solely on the point
of whether the trial court correctly sustained the carrier's special excep-
tions to the claimant's lump sum allegations. The court, speaking through
Justice Keith, in a thorough and persuasive opinion, held that the claimant
was not entitled to submit issues regarding lump sum because the stat-
ute236 only allowed lump sum payments upon remarriage and in cases in-
volving bona fide disputes as to liability. Justice Keith noted the Cortez
opinion but also noted that the court's holding was in keeping with both
234. Id at 161.
235. No. 8127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont, Dec. 28, 1978).
236. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
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the majority and minority opinions in Cortez. In a case involving a re-
lated issue the Fort Worth court somehow Was able to reach a conclusion
almost directly opposite to that reached by Justice Keith and the Beau-
mont court. In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Flores2 37 the
court affirmed a judgment awarding weekly benefits to a widow and two
minor children but also awarding attorney's fees in a lump sum. The trial
court's judgment provided that the carrier should pay a twenty-five percent
attorney's fee on the unaccrued death benefits. The unaccrued benefits
were calculated by use of an unspecified pension table.2 38 The unpaid
death benefits were calculated to have a present value of $58,582.16 and
the attorney's fee was calculated to be $14,645.54. The carrier appealed
only from that portion of the judgment awarding the lump sum attorney's
fee, contending that section 7(d),239 relating to attorney's fees, and section
8,240 relating to death cases, allowed attorney's fees to be paid as the com-
pensation accrued and became payable. The carrier argued that to allow a
lump sum attorney fee while weekly payments remained contingent upon
the death or remarriage of the widow or the dependency of a minor child
made the carrier an insurer against these contingencies, something not
contemplated by the legislature.24'
The court of civil appeals, without any legal analysis, overruled the car-
rier's point of error upon the "authority" of an El Paso court of civil ap-
peals decision allowing lump sum attorney's fees, Liberty MutualInsurance
Co. v. Ramos, 24 2 and upon the supreme court's opinion in Texas Employ-
237. 564 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
238. A finding of "fact" was made by the trial court as follows:
"(b) The Court takes judicial knowledge of the tables and formulae certified
correct by the Industrial Accident Board of Texas in its manual dated the 1st
day of August, 1973, for use in the years 1974-1975, and of Widow's Pension
Table based on the 1960 U.S. Life Tables for White Females and U.S. Em-
ployees used to calculate compensation with the expectancy of death and re-
marriage, and of the life expectancy of Guadalupe Flores and her children.
Based thereon the Court finds that there is a present value and sum certain of
$58,582.16 that can be placed on claimants' case after proper discounts."
Id at 832.
239. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7(d) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
240. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
241. The carrier apparently relied upon an Alabama case to support its argument. The
court noted the argument as follows:
By reason of the foregoing, says Texas Employers' to allow her attorney his
fees in a lump sum would be to compel it to pay such attorney when under the
law, it is the obligation of the client to pay them out of her recovery.
The argument is quite rational. Were the case controlled by Alabama law
there would be probability that Texas Employers' should prevail. See Wood-
ward Iron Co. v. Bradford, 206 Ala. 447, 90 So. 803, 806 (1921) where in a case
having analogy the court wrote: "These words do not authorize the judge to
make the employer, in effect, an insurer against the death or remarnage of a
dependent widow before the maturity of the last payment, or the death or
termination of the dependency of the child before the maturity of said last
payments, and which would be the result by requiring the employer to pay
these fees in advance and look to the last periodical payments for reimburse-
ment."
564 S.W.2d at 833.
242. 543 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
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ers' Insurance Association v. Motley.243 The El Paso court in Ramos also
relied upon the Motley decision. Motley, however, is clearly distinguisha-
ble and offers no support for either Flores or Ramos.
In Motley the claimant was injured on February 18, 1970, some three
and one-half years before the legislature's amended death statute became
effective on September 1, 1973.2' A jury found Motley totally, perma-
nently disabled but refused to award compensation in a lump sum. The
trial court ordered the carrier to make weekly payments to Motley and
further ordered the attorney be paid twenty-five percent of the total
amount recovered, discounted, in a lump sum.245 The supreme court af-
firmed the lump sum attorney fee, noting the difference between an award
made by the Board and a final court judgment. In so doing, it articulated
the precise reasoning which it ultimately ignored in Cortez-the fact that
attorney's fees could not be awarded on a lump sum basis if based on an
award of benefits short of a final judgment, as such award is incapable of
being ascertained with any degree of certainty because the claimant's
death terminated the right to unaccrued weekly benefits. A final judgment
on the other hand cannot be modified or reduced and is payable even after
the claimant's death and, therefore, is capable of specificity with regard to
the total amount recoverable.246 Thus, the attorney's fees are also capable
of being ascertained.24 7
A cursory reading of Motley reveals that it does not support the Flores
court's holding, a fact the Flores court obviously must have known when it
243. 491 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1973).
244. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79), became effective
on September 1, 1973.
245. These facts were gleaned from the court of civil appeals opinion. 483 S.W.2d 709,
710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972).
246. The court wrote:
The statute thus spells out that when the workman is to receive his compensa-
tion in installments as a result of an order of the Board, so is his lawyer.
One reason for this is that when there is no death claim and when recovery
is based on an award of the Board for a general injury, the total amount that
the insurance company is to pay in installments may not be definitely ascer-
tainable at the time of the award. The Board retains the right to modify the
award. Moreover, if the employee dies before he receives all of the compensa-
tion awarded him in weekly payments, the cases say that the liability of the
insurance company ceases; i.e., the unmatured portions of the claim are extin-
guished by his death .... Since this is so, the portion recoverable by the at-
torney may not be ascertainable with certainty at the time of the Board's
award. Hence a lump sum recovery to the attorney would present problems.
On the other hand, if the compensation is based upon a judgment in court,
which judgment has either become final or is affirmed, the amount awarded
by the court does survive the workman's death and is not subject to modifica-
tion or reduction .... The attorney's fees, therefore, may be fixed or ap-
proved with certainty by the trial court in the light of the amount which will
be recovered by the workman or those claiming under him.
491 S.W.2d at 396.
247. The other opinion cited by the Flores court as supporting this holding was Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v Garces, 492 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no
writ). This was also a pre-September, 1973 injury involving the same contentions argued in
Motley. Thus, the court of civil appeals correctly applied Motley and affirmed the lump
sum award of attorney's fees.
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quoted, out of context, the supreme court's comments regarding final judg-
ment.248 More shocking than the court's out of context quotation, how-
ever, is the following statement of an appellate court:
Rationale of all the cases [Motley, Ramos, and Texas Indemnity In-
surance Co. v. Bush,24 ] seemingly stem from the observation in Bush,
supra, that where there the allowance of a lump sum as the attorney's
fee has neither increased the liability of the insurance company or the
recovery against it, it is not entitled.to complain. 2
50
Suffice it to say that the court of civil appeals completely failed to reveal
the method to be used to determine the precise amount that Ms. Flores and
the two minor children recovered against the carrier. Certainly if Ms. Flo-
res and her two children are tragically killed one week after the judgment
is final, recovery against the carrier will have been increased manyfold
because of the attorney's lump sum recovery of more than $14,000.00. In-
credible as it may seem, the court of civil appeals held that despite all of
the contingencies that could occur, the trial court was indeed a "sooth-
sayer" when it found as a fact that "there is a present value and sum cer-
tain of $58,582.16 that can be placed on claimants' case after proper
discounts.,
251
There are questions left unanswered by the court of civil appeals opin-
ion. What if the district court is wrong and Ms. Flores remarries the week
after the attorney's fees are paid, before she has collected $800, let alone an
amount in excess of $58,000.00? Does the carrier have a cause of action
against the attorney for unjust enrichment? On the other hand, suppose
the widow is eighty years old with a life expectancy of only 6.53 years?
252
If the attorney's fees are awarded in a lump sum, but the widow lives for
twenty years collecting weekly benefits, does the attorney have a cause of
action for additional attorney's fees? If so, when does the cause of action
accrue, at the end of 6.53 years? What would be the statute of limitation
applicable to the claim? Where does it all end? It seems that the courts, in
their haste to be liberal and progressive, have not really thought through
some of the obvious problems engendered by their far-reaching opinions.
A prediction that the above mentioned problems will eventually be liti-
248. Compare the Flores court's partial quotation from Motley, 564 S.W.2d at 833-34,
with the full quotation in note 246 supra.
249. 163 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ refd). This case simply held
that the carrier had no standing to complain regarding the percentage of the award appor-
tioned to the attorney as his fee as long as its liability or the amount it was required to pay
was not increased.
250. 564 S.W.2d at 834.
251. Id. at 832 (emphasis added). The district court must not only gaze into the future
regarding remarriage but must also predict the widow's life expectancy without the benefit
of a physical examination or the answers to a health questionnaire. The use of a life expec-
tancy table presupposes that the person inquired about is in good health. Since the district
court has no statutory manner in which it can determine the person's state of health, one can
only guess at how this fact is to be ascertained.




gated will be at least as accurate as a district court's prediction regarding
the date of a widow's death or remarriage.
Postal Service as Agent for Filing Notices. Section 5 of article 8307253 re-
quires that a party not willing to abide by the Board's final ruling file a
notice with the Board that the party will appeal the ruling to the district
court. This notice must be filed within twenty days of the date of the
Board's ruling. Prior to Ward v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co.254 the
statute was strictly construed. It had been held for many years that if a
party chose to deliver the required notice by mail, then the post office be-
came the party's agent and if a delay by the post office resulted in late
delivery of the notice, the party would not have perfected an appeal. 255
Ward has now revoked that rule because, according to the supreme
court, applying the rule "would lead to a harsh and inequitable result in
this case. '  The court held that if the notice of intention to appeal from a
Board ruling is sent by first class mail, properly addressed and stamped,
and the notice is deposited in the mail one day or more before the twenty
day period expires and the Board receives the notice not more than ten
days after the twenty days expires, then the notice is timely filed. The
court wrote: "In the interest of uniformity, this construction of Section 5 of
Article 8307 coincides with the notice provisions of Rule 5 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. To the extent that any cases conflict with this
construction of Section 5, they are overruled."'2 5
This opinion is a matchless example of an exercise of raw judicial power
resulting in nothing less than a judicial rewriting of a legislative enact-
ment. The fact that the law has been consistently interpreted and applied
strictly for fifty-two years by Texas's past jurists,258 and the fact that the
253. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) provides in perti-
nent part as follows:
Any interested party who is not willing and does not consent to abide by the
final ruling and decision of said Board shall, within twenty (20) days after the
rendition of said final ruling and decision by said Board, file with said Board
notice that he will not abide by said final ruling and decision. And he shall
within twenty (20) days after giving such notice bring suit in the county where
the injury occurred, or in the county where the employee resided at the time
the injury occurred (or, if such employee is deceased, then in the county where
the employee resided at the time of his death), to set aside said final ruling and
decision, and said Board shall proceed no further toward the adjustment of
such claim, other than hereinafter provided.
254. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 184 (Jan. 10, 1979).
255. Eg., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Box, 531 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1976, writ refd n.r.e.); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Kohn, 425 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App -
Austin 1968, no writ); Yancy v. Texas Gen. Indem. Co., 425 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Millican, 115 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1938, writ refd).
256. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct J. at 185..
257. Id.
258. The original Compensation Act only provided that suit could be brought to set aside
the Board's award but did not specify a time limit. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 179, § 5, at 433.
In the 1917 revision, however, § 5 was amended to require notice to the Board within 20
days as well as filing of suit within 20 days of the date of notice to the Board. 1917 Tex.
Gen. Laws ch. 103, § 5, at 283.
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legislature has not amended the statute in spite of this consistent, strict
construction, demands that the court present at least some explanation for
any change in what is now perceived as the legislative intent.25 9 The lack
of any analysis, let alone persuasive analysis, to justify the break with fifty-
two years of judicial and legislative thinking, stands as a sad commentary
on our court system and an affront to the American system of government.
Moreover, the supreme court failed to explain how the language of sec-
tion 5 allowed such elastic construction as given to it by the court. Section
5 provides that notice shall be filed with the Board within twenty days
after the Board's award is rendered. The statute does not provide for any
excuse or enlargement as does the elastic "good cause" clause in section
4a,26 ° which provides that for good cause the Board may "waive the strict
compliance with the foregoing limitations as to notice, and the filing of the
claim before the Board."2 6 ' The supreme court also conveniently ignored
the fact that the legislature specifically spoke to the issue of enlargement
when it added section 5b 262 in 1937263 to provide extra time to file both
notice and suit if the last day fell on a legal holiday or Sunday. The legis-
lature has never evidenced any inclination to change the statute to con-
form to rule 5264 even though rule 5 became effective March 1, 1950.265
It should be noted that this new judicially legislated time period in
which to file appeal notice is limited to filing notice and does not include
filing suit to set aside the award which must be filed within twenty days of
the date of filing notice of intent to appeal.266 The filing of suit has been
held to be jurisdictional and to constitute a general statute of limitation.267
Thus, the court must eventually answer the question it overlooked in its
haste-what date is to be used to calculate the twenty day period in which
to file suit? Rule 5 simply provides that if the item being mailed is re-
ceived not more than ten days "tardily" 268 it shall "be deemed filed in
time. '2 69 Does "in time" mean the same as if filed on the last day of the
original period or the day actually received and filed by the Board? Actu-
ally, the court's language does not even coincide with that of rule 5.
Where rule 5 provides that the item will be deemed "filed in time," 270 the
court writes "the notice shall be deemed timely filed."27 1 Is there a distinc-
259. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 185.
260. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).
261. Id (emphasis added).
262. Id, § 5b.
263. 1937 Tex. Laws, 2nd Spec. Sess., ch. 19, § 1, at 1890.
264. TEX. R. Civ. P. 5.
265. Id.
266. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). See note 253
supra.
267. Oilmen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Franklin, 116 Tex. 59, 286 S.W. 195 (1926); Richards
v. Consolidated Underwriters, 411 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967, writ refd);
Crain v. Davis, 411 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd); Braden v.
Transport Ins. Co., 307 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, no writ).
268. TEx. R. Civ. P. 5.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 185.
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tion? Perhaps not. Under any of the language, the question still remains
as to when the last twenty day period begins to run. Does it begin the last
day of the statutory period or the day the Board files the notice? It could
be an important distinction.
Mrs. Ward will not be the last claimant to claim that equity should in-
tervene to prevent section 5 from barring a claim. The next case will in-
volve the notice dropped in the mail box on the next to the last day but
undelivered by the postal service until the eleventh day because it became
"lost in the mail." The undelivered letter is not the fault of the claimant,
and it will be harsh and inequitable not to allow relief even though the
claimant did choose the mail as the instrument of delivery. The supreme
court legislated a ten day period in Ward, but why should one day make
any difference since the undelivered notice was not the fault of either
claimant? No rational distinction can be made. Thus, an exception will be
made for this claimant. The next case will involve twelve days, then
fifteen, then twenty-five and so on. There will also be cases on the other
end of the mail process. Since the notice must be deposited in the mail one
day or more before the expiration of the twenty day period,272 the court
will soon face the issue involving the secretary who is on her way to the
post office at 11:55 p.m. on the last day to post the notice, when, through
no fault of her own, she is injured in a car accident. Naturally the notice is
not posted until five hours, one day or two days later. Shall another excep-
tion be made? Each exception increases the probability that broader ex-
ceptions will follow in order to prevent an unjust result. Each time an
exception is made there will inevitably arise another case which is only
slightly beyond the last line that was drawn. Once more, the cry of inequi-
table result will be heard because it is unfair to make a distinction for one
case and refuse to in another case which is only slightly different.
Suit to set Aside Award. As previously noted, 73 the procedure to set aside
a Board award is governed by article 8307, section 5,274 which requires a
suit to be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction twenty days after filing
an appeal notice with the Board. Section 5 also requires, however, that the
272. Id One example of the real-life situations which will continue to assault the courts
begging to be an exception to the rule is Texas State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy v. Fulcher,
515 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The question con-
fronting the court was whether it could consider appellee's motion for rehearing. The opin-
ion was delivered on Sept. 19, 1974. The envelope containing the motion for rehearing was
not postmarked until Oct. 4, 1974, and not received until Oct. 7, 1974. The last day to mail
the motion, under rule 5, was Oct. 3, 1974.
Based upon affidavits filed with the court of civil appeals it appeared that a secretary for
the law firm representing appellee placed the envelope in a mail slot at the San Benito post
office on Oct. 2, 1974. The mail was sent from San Benito without postmark to McAllen to
be postmarked and delivered. The truck transporting the mail from San Benito to the
McAllen post office normally delivered the mail to McAllen the same day. On Oct. 3, 1974,
the truck broke down, and the mail was delivered to McAllen five hours late. The court of
civil appeals found as a fact based upon the affidavits that the envelope was "mailed" on
Oct. 2, 1974. Thus, the motion for rehearing was considered and overruled.
273. See notes 253 & 267 supra and accompanying text.
274. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
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suit be both instituted and prosecuted within the twenty day period." 5
Fortunately, the courts have held that this dual requirement is satisfied
when a claimant files a petition within twenty days with the bona fide in-
tent that citation shall issue and be served at once or that a waiver of cita-
tion will be obtained and filed at once.2 76 This rule was reaffirmed in
Wilborn v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association.2 7 The carrier prop-
erly and timely gave its appeal notice and filed suit to set aside the Board's
award. On the day suit was filed citation for service was issued but was
returned unexecuted because the claimant could not be found since he
"[1]eft Lubbock about two months ago. Destination unknown." '27 8 Several
days later, the carrier's attorney filed suit in county court on another but
different claim involving the claimant. The claimant's attorney filed an
answer. Thereafter, the claimant's oral deposition was set by agreement in
the county court suit, the carrier's attorneys intending to secure service on
the claimant at the deposition. This deposition was postponed, however,
after the claimant's attorney admitted he could not find his client. The
claimant's deposition was later noticed, but there was no appearance.
Based upon these facts, the court of civil appeals concluded that the carrier
had established an affirmative and continuing intent to prosecute the dis-
trict court suit and had, therefore, complied with section 5's filing and
prosecution requirements.
In recent years, the most common reason for dismissing compensation
suits has been the claimant naming the wrong carrier as defendant or the
carrier naming the wrong claimant as defendant or the carrier misnaming
itself.2 9 Fortunately, the courts have recently shown mercy upon claim-
ants and carriers making inadvertent mistakes which do not mislead the
other party.28 ° Such was not the case, however, in Cormier v. Texas Em-
275. Id.
276. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Jones, 129 Tex. 392, 104 S.W.2d 847 (1937); Ocean Accident
& Guar. Corp. v. May, 15 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, judgmt adopted); Buffalo
Ins. Co. v. McLendon, 402 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966, no writ); Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co. v. Spillers, 88 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1935, writ refd).
277. 558 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
278. Id at 68. At this point in the evidence recitation, the court wrote: "These facts are
sufficient, as a matter of law, for us to conclude that the ... [carrier] has complied with the
requirements of § 5 of 8307, supra, to perfect its appeal to set aside the award of the Indus-
trial Accident Board." Id
This holding is perhaps somewhat premature since the carrier attempted service only
once. If there were no other facts to demonstrate continuing efforts to serve the claimant, it
is doubtful that the court would be so kindly disposed to an insurance company.
279. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 543 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Transport Ins. Co. v. Jaegar, 534 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Sarver, 531
S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (carrier misnamed claimant);
Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Square, 526 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (carrier misnamed self); Garcia v. Employers Cas. Co., 519 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (claimant misnamed carrier); Carpenter v. Gulf Ins.
Co., 515 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ) (claimant misnamed car-
rier); Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Martin, 501 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1973), jiudgml mod#iedper curiam, 505 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. 1974) (claimant
misnamed carrier).
280. Sanchez v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 543 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
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ployers' Insurance Association.28' Plaintiff, volunteer fireman for the City
of Port Neches, was injured fighting a fire. Plaintiff filed suit naming
Texas Employers' Insurance Association as the defendant. The carrier an-
swered with an "unsworn denial. ' 282 Two months later, the plaintiff
amended and joined the city as a defendant. The city answered, admitting
it was self-insured under the Texas Municipal League 283 and denying that
TEIA had issued it a compensation policy. The trial court granted a judg-
ment non obstante veredicto in favor of TEIA and the city.
Plaintiff conceded that his suit should have named the city as the de-
fendant. He relied upon two recent supreme court opinions, Continental
Southern Lines, Inc. v. Hilland 84 and Price v. Estate of Anderson285 to
excuse his mistake. In each case, the plaintiff misnamed the defendant and
failed to correct the mistake until after the statute of limitation had ex-
pired. In Price the court held the statute inapplicable because the defend-
ant had not been misled or prejudiced with respect to its defense, while in
Continental the court remanded for a determination whether the defend-
ant had been mislead. Plaintiff also relied on Sanchez v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. 286 In Sanchez the carrier named Aetna Life and Casualty
Company (parent company) as the plaintiff when it should have named
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (subsidiary company). The court
refused to dismiss the appeal because the claimant had not been mislead or
prejudiced. The Cormier court distinguished these three cases, noting that
1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Sarver, 531 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Square, 526 S.W.2d
635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
281. 564 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
282. Id at 178. It is unclear from the opinion whether the carrier filed anything more
than a general denial. One can only assume the court means general denial when it speaks
of an "unsworn denial."
283. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309h (Vernon Supp. 1978-79), effective July 1,
1974, provides that all political subdivisions shall become "either self-insurers, provide in-
surance under workmen's compensation insurance contract or policies, or enter into inter-
local agreements with other political subdivisions providing for self-insurance, extending
workmen's compensation benefits to their employees." A political subdivision is defined as
"a county, home rule city, a city, town or village organized under the general laws of this
state, a special district, a school district, a junior college district, or any other legally consti-
tuted political subdivision of the state." Id Many political subdivisions have become self-
insured through a self-insurance program established through the Texas Municipal League.
The League, in turn, contracts with Texas Employers' Insurance Association to be the serv-
icing contractor for each self-insured entity and provide claim adjusters to investigate and
handle each claim. In the event of litigation, Texas Employers' retains their regular defense
counsel to represent the political subdivision involved. The wording of the statute makes it
plain, however, that Texas Employers' is not a party to the claim. Section 3(b) of art. 8309h
provides that in any adopted provision of the Compensation Act the words "association,"
"subscriber," or "employer," or their equivalents shall be construed to and shall mean "a
political subdivision." Id Thus, any suit brought by a claimant to set aside an award involv-
ing a self-insured political subdivision would be required to be brought against the political
subdivision specifically and not the Texas Municipal League, Texas Association of School
Boards Workmen's Compensation Self-Insurance Fund, Texas Employers' Insurance Asso-
ciation, or any similar organization.
284. 528 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1975).
285. 522 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1975).
286. 543 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
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in all three the true party defendant knew the lawsuit had been filed
whereas there was no evidence that the City of Port Neches ever knew of
the appeal until it was made a party to the suit. Moreover, the court noted
that there was no evidence showing any connection between TEIA and the
city as there was shown between the parties in Continental, Price, and
Sanchez. Thus, the trial court's take-nothing judgment was affirmed.
Payment of Board Award. Carriers, when paying Board awards, should
carefully note the Houston [ 14th District] court's opinion in Sanchez v. Lib-
erty Mutual Insurance Co. 287 A Board's award favoring the employee was
timely appealed by the employee. The carrier, unaware that the employee
had filed suit, paid the award, sending a draft to the claimant and her
attorney. The claimant promptly negotiated the draft retaining seventy-
five percent and the attorney retaining twenty-five percent as his fee. The
carrier, undoubtedly chagrined, answered the suit and moved for summary
judgment contending that the claimant's acceptance of payment of the
Board's award barred an appeal of the same award. The trial court, be-
lieving the carrier's position to be logical, sustained the motion for sum-
mary judgment.
The court of civil appeals reversed the judgment, holding that as of the
date suit was filed, the Board's award was vacated and was of no signifi-
cance.28 Thus, the carrier's subsequent payment of the nonexistent award
was a voluntary contribution to be credited against any judgment that the
claimant recovered.289 Perhaps the greatest shock was received by the
claimant's attorney. The court held that the attorney wrongfully retained a
portion of the voluntary compensation payment as a legal fee because the
district court had not approved the fee as required by article 8306, section
7d.29 ° Thus, the court held that the claimant was entitled to recover from
her attorney the portion he withheld.
Death Benefits-Beneficiaries. In Griith v. Christian29" ' a deceased
worker had two children by a prior marriage who had subsequently been
adopted by their stepfather prior to the death of the decedent. After his
divorce, the deceased had remarried and fathered two more children. The
children, both minors, by the first marriage claimed entitlement to a por-
tion of the compensation death benefits awarded the second wife and the
children, both minors, by the second marriage. The adopted children con-
tended that the Dallas court's opinion in Dickerson v. Texas Employers'
292 
oes
Insurance Association was controlling over the supreme court's opinion
287. 570 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
288. This is a well established proposition for which the court cited Latham v. Security
Ins. Co., 491 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. 1972), and Buffalo Ins. Co. v. McLendon, 402 S.W.2d 559
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966, no writ).
289. The court cited no authorities to support this proposition.
290. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7d (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
291. 564 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
292. 451 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, no writ).
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in Patton v. Shamburger293 and the El Paso court's opinion in Banegas v.
Holmquist.2 94 The unadopted children argued that the adopted children
did not qualify as "minor children" under the terms of the compensation
death benefits statute295 because Patton held that while adopted children
could inherit from their natural parents, worker compensation death bene-
fits were not derived by inheritance but by statute. Thus, upon adoption
the relationship between a natural parent and the children ceased, and
they were no longer natural children of the parent for compensation pur-
poses. This holding was followed in Zanella v. Superior Insurance Co.,296
and in Holmquist, wherein both courts held that a parent or parents should
receive the death benefits to the exclusion of the decedent's natural chil-
dren who had been adopted before their father's death.
In Dickerson one of the deceased worker's five children had been
adopted prior to his death, but the others had not. The Dallas court held
that the exclusion of the adopted child amounted to an invidious discrimi-
nation between two equal classes of children without fault on the part of
the adopted child who had no choice in the matter. The court in Griith,
however, chose to follow the Patton, Zanella, Holmquist line of cases. The
court held that the minor adopted children had not been deprived of any
rights but had simply transferred their rights from one parent to another
and thus were not entitled to share in death benefits under the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act.
Wage Rate. The statutory scheme used to compute a Worker's monetary
recovery in compensation cases is contingent upon the worker's wage
rate.297 Wage rate is a technical issue referred to by one commentator as a
"three-horned devil. '298 This devil grappled with another claimant during
the survey year and converted a permanent partial verdict into a new trial.
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Bewley29 9 the claimant, the
owner of a heavy equipment rental business, alleged that he worked at
least 210 days in the year preceding his injury and earned an average
weekly wage of $320. He alleged no alternative grounds for determining
average weekly wage. The jury found that the claimant did work at least
210 days and earned an average daily wage of $64.00. The carrier con-
tended the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support thejury's average daily wage answer. The court of civil appeals agreed, re-
versing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case for a new trial.
293. 431 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1968).
294. 535 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
295. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
296. 443 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969, writ ref'd).
297. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 10, 11, 12 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79); id art.
8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
298. Molberg, Workers' Compensation-The Importance of Average Weekly Wage,
TRIAL LAW. F., July-Sept. 1978, at 3.
299. 560 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ). This opinion




The claimant testified that he worked as a heavy equipment operator at
least 210 days in the year preceding his injury and most of that work was
on an hourly rate. He did not pay himself a weekly wage or salary but
simply drew checks on the company account in order to pay his expenses.
The claimant's income tax returns were placed in evidence showing his
gross income as well as his labor costs. The claimant did not produce his
various invoice records which would have revealed the times that he
worked as an operator.
The court of civil appeals opinion contains a lengthy evidence recitation
as well as numerous liberal quotes from prior cases. In summary, the court
remanded the case for a new trial because while the claimant produced
evidence that he worked and earned money as an operator, he failed to
produce evidence that he was paid any specific sum as wages. The court
also noted the evidence establishing the scale paid a union operator, such
as the claimant's son who worked as an operator for his father, and noted
that this testimony would have supported a just and fair finding under
paragraph 3.3" Unfortunately, as the court held, such evidence would not
support a paragraph 1 finding that the claimant actually earned a specific
daily wage. The moral of Bewley-don't grapple with three-horned devils
unless you plead that you are possessed of a trident with at least two and
preferably three sharp prongs capable of a successful kill.
Medical Expenses. Last year the Fifth Circuit held that an employee cov-
ered by the Texas Compensation Act is entitled to recover from the carrier
the cost of medical treatment rendered to him by the Veterans' Adminis-
tration for an on-the-job injury.3 °" This year, on petition for rehearing,302
the court held that the employee's assignment to the Veterans' Administra-
tion of his rights against the compensation carrier was not void because of
the Texas anti-assignment statute.30 3 The court noted that the assignment
was made pursuant to a Veterans's Administration regulation that had the
force of federal law. Since the federal regulation was only a "minor tres-
pass ' 3" 4 on the state scheme and since the Constitution's supremacy clause
prevented a state from conditioning the operation of a workers' compensa-
tion statute in a manner which frustrated the purpose of a national statute,
the petition for rehearing was denied.
Nursing Services. An important but little known aspect of a nursing serv-ices claim was successfully litigated by the carrier in Finch v. Texas Em-
ployers' Insurance Association.3 " The primary issue involved in the
appeal was the breadth and scope of a wife's claim for nursing services
rendered to her husband.
300. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(3) (Vernon 1967).
301. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. United States, 558 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1977), reviewed
in Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 365-66.
302. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. United States, 569 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1978).
303. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
304. 569 F.2d at 875.
305. 564 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref d n.r.e).
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As a result of a compensable injury Finch was rendered a paraplegic. A
compromise settlement agreement was negotiated whereby the carrier
agreed to pay all future medical expenses related to the original injury.
The carrier later refused to pay Mrs. Finch for her nursing services. After
a jury trial, the claimant and his wife appealed alleging several errors but
in particular complaining of the trial court's instruction accompanying the
special issue inquiring into the value of nursing services rendered by Mrs.
Finch. The instruction provided: "You are instructed in your considera-
tion of this issue that you are not to take into consideration any services
performed by Netta Finch as usual domestic services performed by a wife,
but are to only consider the services usually performed by a person en-
gaged in such activity."3"
The claimant argued that the instruction assumed that a wife's domestic
services cannot be nursing services and, therefore, misinformed the jury.
The claimant asserted that the issue and instructions submitted in Home
Indemnity Co. v. Draper"7 should have been submitted. That instruction
stated as follows:
Special Issue No. 1
What do you find from a preponderance of the evidence to be the
reasonable cost of the services rendered for William Draper for his
reasonably required nursing care from the date of his injury to the
present?
You are instructed that the term "nursing care", as used above, in-
cludes all those services, if any, performed by Mrs. Draper as required
by Mr. Draper's condition resulting from the injury in question.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.3°8
The Dallas court held that the Finch instruction was in accord with the
leading case involving a wife's right to recover for nursing services ren-
dered to her husband, Transport Insurance Co. v. Polk.30 9 In Polk the
supreme court carefully distinguished between a wife's usual domestic du-
ties and the wife's extraordinary nursing services, describing nursing serv-
ices as follows:
[L]ike those services performed by Mr. Tejada [a licensed voca-
tional nurse3 '], but during the time he was not on duty. Those are
such services as cutting up his food, holding a glass or cup while he
drinks, turning him over in bed every two hours, raising and lowering
him in bed, seeing that he does not become malpositioned in bed,
keeping him and the bed clean and dry to avoid ulcers, rubbing his
skin with alcohol, keeping him covered at night, providing medication
for him during his sleepless nights, draining his urine bag, and clean-
ing Mr. Polk and changing the bed linens following his bowel move-
306. Id at 809.
307. 504 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1973, writ refd n.r.e.).
308. Id. at 572.
309. 400 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1966).
310. Polk was a quadriplegic. The physicians testified that he needed constant care and
attention. Mr. Tejada, the nurse, worked 10 hours per day, six days per week and four hours
on Sunday. Mrs. Polk performed the needed services the remainder of the time.
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ments. These are services that three doctors said were necessary and
which Mr. Tejada performed when he was present.31'
Based upon the Polk distinction the Dallas court held that an instruction
such as submitted by the trial court was necessary in order to enable the
jury to delineate between compensable nursing services and noncompensa-
ble domestic services that would be routinely performed even if the hus-
band were not disabled. The court also distinguished the Draper opinion
pointing out that in that case the carrier did not complain that the instruc-
tion allowed the jury to award money for domestic services and the court
did not specifically approve the issue and definition.
The Finch opinion points up a problem regarding proper jury instruc-
tions. If one were unfamiliar with the special issues to be submitted in a
compensation case involving nursing services, one would be tempted to
consult the state bar's Pattern Jury Charge book.312 The suggested issue
contained in the Pattern Jury Charge book,31 3 however, is not only biased,
but is totally erroneous. The issue suggested by a supposedly impartial
state bar committee is taken verbatim from the Draper opinion,314 an
opinion which only cited the Polk case one time in the course of the opin-
ion and which never discussed Polk's limitations on the wife's reimburse-
ment for nursing services rendered to her husband. In turn, the Pattern
Jury Charge Committee either ignored or was unaware of Polk because
Polk is never cited or referred to in any part of the committee's lengthy
comment regarding the Draper instruction. As the Dallas court cogently
pointed out in Finch, a wife cannot recover for domestic services that
would normally be rendered to an able-bodied husband, and a jury must
be informed of this distinction in order to render an intelligent and legally
correct verdict. The Draper instruction simply advises the jury that nurs-
ing services include "all those services . . .required by . . .[claimant's]
condition resulting from the injury. 31 5 It is submitted that the Pattern
Jury Charge Committee should amend the suggested issue in nursing serv-
ices cases to properly reflect the state of the law as enunciated by the
supreme court.316
Concurrent Coverage. Congress extensively amended the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) in 1972.3 7
Numerous interpretation problems were generated by the Act's unique
language3'8 not the least of which concerned concurrent coverage of a
311. 400 S.W.2d at 884.
312. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES (1970).
313. Id at 17-18 (Supp. 1976).
314. See note 308 supra and accompanying text.
315. 504 S.W.2d at 572.
316. This is only one example of several suggested issues which are one-sided and biased.
Another example involves heart attacks and strokes. See Sartwelle, supra note 190, at 243-
53. This is a criticism of the current Texas approach to heart attack-stroke cases including
the special issues suggested by the Pattern Jury Charge Committee.
317. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976). Additional amendments were enacted in 1978. Pub.
L. No. 95-251, § 2(a)(10), 92 Stat. 183 (1978).
318. See generally 4 A. LARSON, supra note 8, §§ 89.00-.70.
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state's worker compensation law and the LHWCA. 31 9 This concurrency
issue arose in Johnson v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association.320 Un-
happily, the solution the majority chose to follow appears to sink the con-
troversy deeper into confusion and thrust Texas into an uncharted land of
Oz.
Johnson asserted a Texas compensation claim because of an injury that
he received while working for Bethlehem Steel Corporation at its Beau-
mont shipyard located on an island near the city. The fabrication shop,
where plaintiff worked as an assistant crane operator fabricating marine
vessels, was 75 to 100 feet from navigable waters. In the trial court the
carrier asserted a plea to the court's jurisdiction, contending that the em-
ployee's injuries were solely within LHWCA coverage, which the court
sustained.
The majority of the court of civil appeals had no difficulty in determin-
ing that the claimant satisfied the LHFIWCA dual employee requirements of
status and situs, and was an employee within the Act's coverage. Upon
this issue, everyone was in agreement, the employer, the carrier, the major-
ity and dissenting 32' justices--everyone except the employee. To say that
the employee's argument was unusual is an understatement when it is
remembered that the LHWCA paid $318.38 per week and the Texas Act
paid $70.00 per week at that time.322 The majority then analyzed the pri-
mary issue of concurrent jurisdiction, concluding that since LHWCA was
not exclusive before 1972 and there was nothing in the 1972 amendments
to indicate that Congress intended the LHWCA to be exclusive, Texas had
concurrent jurisdiction with LHWCA over the employee's injury.
The majority's concurrency holding created a pressing problem: double
recovery for the same injury, one under LHWCA and one under the Texas
Act. To this delicate problem the majority had a quick, simple answer:
"[S]hould plaintiff below, Tom Johnson, recover any award under the
Texas Act, the entire amount awarded under L. H. W. C. A. shall be de-
ducted from that award."323 Thus, the case was reversed and remanded
for trial.
Justice Keith, one of Texas's most able and articulate appellate judges,
offered what can only be termed a brilliant dissenting opinion which must
be read in its entirety to be appreciated. To begin with, Justice Keith
noted the unusual aspects of the case and in so doing provided additional
historical detail omitted by the majority:
Plaintiff's employer determined that he was an employee within the
319. Id See also Larson, The Conflicts Problem Between the Longshoremen's Act and
State Workmen's Compensation Act Under the 1972 Amendments, 14 Hous. L. REV. 287
(1977); Larson, The Conflict of Laws Problem Between the Longshoremen's Act and State
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 699 (1972).
320. 558 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.) (Keith, J., dissent-
ing).
321. Id. at 52.
322. Id at 53.
323. Id at 52.
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meaning of. . . [LHWCA]; the plaintiff agreed in this determination
by accepting some $3,000.00 from Bethlehem in payment of benefits
under LHWCA; and, now this Court has agreed that the parties made
the correct determination of coverage: plaintiff was, indeed, covered
as a beneficiary under LHWCA when he was injured.
• . . Plaintiff has invoked the jurisdiction of the state district court
to collect the weekly compensation payments which he claims are due
by reason of his injury. In so doing, to paraphrase one of the writers
on the subject, he walked out of a $318.38 Act [LHWCA] into a
$70.00 Act [Texas]. I will comment upon possible motivation later.
To say the least, this is a most unusual move by a claimant of money
benefits.324
Justice Keith then analyzed the competing concurrency arguments and
authorities, concluding that the employee's claim for compensation was
exclusively governed by LHWCA. He then turned to the majority's solu-
tion of the double recovery problem, pointing out a myriad of pitfalls that
one encounters when confronted by the reality of the majority's judicially
created offset system. As to why a claimant would be tempted to foresake
the LHWCA's high weekly payments for the lower weekly benefits offered
in Texas, Justice Keith observed:
To encourage the injured workman to "walk"... from one act to the
other, there must be some strong and persuasive reason. I speculate
that it possibly may be attributable to two concurrent factors: (a) the
prevalent and widespread practice [of which I take judicial notice] of
lump-sum settlement agreement being concluded between the com-
pensation carrier and the injured workmen under the Texas practice,
even when the claim is for temporary partial incapacity; and (b) the
difference in the method of affixing (and the amount of) the fees of the
injured workman's counsel. As to the first, the attractiveness of a
lump sum payment to the injured workman may well outweigh the
advantages of a much larger sum dribble, out over a long period of
time.
As to the second factor, an examination of the two Acts reveals a
vast difference in the treatment of such fees. Whereas, under the State
Act, an award of one-fourth of the benefits payable is practically stan-
dard since authorized by the Act. . . . under LHWCA fees may be
charged against the employer or insurer or fixed by the Board or court
under other circumstances ... 325
II. PROCEDURAL LAW
Special Issues. The special issue submission of a workers' compensation
324. Id. at 52-53 (footnotes omitted).
325. Id at 57. Justice Keither specifically disavowed any implication that one forum
might offer a more favorable factual determination than another as being a factor in the
employee's choice of coverage. He also specifically disavowed any intent to ascribe certain
motives to the employee's counsel who, he noted, had an outstanding reputation for ability,
probity, and professional ethics. Id.
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case can often prove complicated beyond imagination,326 and the supreme
court has with Select Insurance Co. v. Boucher327 added another opinion to
further complicate the area. In that case plaintiff pled for total disability
only, and the defendant pled partial incapacity as a defense. The trial
court refused to submit issues or instructions on partial incapacity, submit-
ting only the issues inquiring about total incapacity. The jury found that
the injury resulted in six and three-quarter years temporary total incapac-
ity. The trial court entered judgment for the claimant, which the court of
civil appeals affirmed.
The supreme court held that the partial incapacity issue tendered by
Select 328 was an inferential rebuttal issue because it was relied upon as a
defense and not an alternative ground of recovery. Since rule 277329 out-
laws inferential rebuttal issue submission, the court held that the trial court
correctly refused to submit the partial incapacity issues to the jury. Select
argued that even if partial incapacity was an inferential rebuttal issue the
trial court should have at least submitted its tendered definition of partial
incapacity330 in order that the jury could consider partial incapacity as a
defense to total incapacity. The court noted, however, that Select's partial
incapacity definition was incorrect because of the insertion of an extra
word33' and the failure to define earning capacity. Thus, the carrier's in-
struction was not in "substantially correct ' 33 2 form, and the trial court
properly rejected the instruction. The court did note, however:
We hold, under the posture of the instant case, that the defensive
issue of partial incapacity is an inferential rebuttal issue and that by
virtue of Rule 277 Select Insurance Company was not entitled to its
submission. Select Insurance Company would have been entitled to
the submission of a definition of "partial incapacity" if one in sub-
stantially correct form had been requested. 333
326. See, e.g., Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 347 S.W.2d 605
(1961); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Craik, 162 Tex. 260, 346 S.W.2d 830 (1961); Home Indem. Co.
v. McKay, 543 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ); Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Loesch, 538 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Western
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Webb, 512 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974), rev'd er curiam,
517 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1975); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 513 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1974, no writ).
327. 561 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. 1978).
328. The issue was quoted by the court. Id at 476. The issue was taken from the "short
form" compensation charge suggested by the Pattern Jury Charge Committee. 2 STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES 10 (1970). The missing issue, issue 2C, com-
mented upon by the supreme court, was the issue regarding earning capacity which was
superfluous under the circumstances. Id at 476.
329. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
330. The definition submitted to the trial court was quoted by the court as follows:
"'Partial Incapacity' means any degree of incapacity less than total incapacity; or whereby a
person suffers a reduction in earning capacity. A person cannot have both total and partial
incapacity at the same time." 561 S.W.2d at 478. This definition is obviously erroneous
because it adds a semicolon after the third "incapacity" and adds the word "or" before the
phrase related to earning capacity. See 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY
CHARGES 62 (1970).
33 1. See note 330 supra.
332. TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.
333. 561 S.W.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
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This parting statement by the supreme court became the basis for a disa-
greement among the judges of the El Paso court of civil appeals in Texas
Employers' Insurance Association v. Marsh.334 As in Boucher, the em-
ployee alleged he was totally, permanently disabled without any alterna-
tive partial incapacity allegations. The carrier, however, only filed a
general denial. Although the trial court submitted a complete compensa-
tion charge, 335 including partial incapacity issues, the jury answered only
the total incapacity issues and found that the employee sustained total,
permanent incapacity. The carrier objected to the receipt of this "incom-
plete verdict"33" because the jury was not required to answer the partial
issues. The trial court, however, entered judgment for the claimant on the
basis of the jury's answers.
The court of civil appeals affirmed, citing Boucher for the proposition
that the partial issues should not have been submitted. The majority
noted, however, that neither party objected to the submission of the issues.
Nevertheless, the majority held that the unanswered issues did not render
the verdict incomplete because the trial court's written jury instructions
advised the jury that total and partial incapacity could not exist at the
same time. "Thus, it would appear . . . that the jury logically concluded
that" 337 since the claimant was totally, permanently incapacitated, he
could not, under the trial court's instructions, be partially incapacitated to
any degree and they had answered all issues required to be answered.
Chief Justice Preslar noted his dissent not with the result reached but
rather with the reason given by the majority to support the result. The
majority had stated: "Under the decision in [Boucher], a compensation
carrier is not entitled to submit special issues as to partial incapacity as
inferential rebuttal issues. ' 33 8 The chief justice noted that the majority's
statement was not necessary to the decision in the case and was a blanket
proposition without support in the Boucher opinion because Boucher's
holding was expressly limited to the facts of that case.3 39 The chief justice
further argued that Boucher did not abolish partial incapacity issues in all
cases in which total incapacity issues were submitted.
The dissent is perhaps splitting hairs. The majority conclusion that par-
tial incapacity issues cannot be submitted as inferential rebuttal issues
seems correct, but the dissent was correct in pointing out that the discus-
sion of Boucher was not necessary to the disposition of the issue facing the
court. In fact, the entire case easily could have been disposed of in four or
five paragraphs instead of five pages. Chief Justice Preslar echoed this
feeling and isolated the real issue involved in Boucher and Marsh and
other similar cases when he wrote:340
334. 567 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ).
335. The charge is quoted in its entirety by the court. Id at 833.
336. TEX. R. Cv. P. 295.
337. 567 S.W.2d at 834.
338. Id. (Preslar, C.J., dissenting).
339. See note 333 supra and accompanying text.
340. 567 S.W.2d at 835.
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Aside from all the philosophical discussions of whether issues are
"inferential rebuttal" or "defensive," a trial is a search for the truth.
If the truth is that the disability is partial, there should be a method of
determining that, even though there is a claim of total incapacity. The
all-or-nothing approach would be bad public policy-bad for the
workman who is in fact partially disabled. Insurers should be en-
couraged to admit partial incapacity where it exists and thus plead it
and get a determination of it by the jury.34 '
Medical Examination-Rule 167a. In the past it has been the practice of
some trial courts to allow the following types of questions to unfairly bol-
ster a plaintiffs case: "'Q. 'Did the insurance company ever ask you to be
examined by any doctor they chose? 'A. No'. . . 'Q. 'Have you ever re-
fused to be examined by anybody for anything since you have made this
claim following your injury . . .? 'A. No sir.' "342 This type of interro-
gation has now been held to be impermissible and reversible error in a
compensation case,343 just as it is in a liability case. 3"
Request for Admissions-Lump Sum. Lump sum payments in lieu of
weekly compensation are authorized by the Act345 if the parties agree and
the Board or court either approves or finds that manifest hardship and
injury would result to the worker if compensation were paid weekly.3 46 It
has been routine practice for many years for the worker's attorney to re-
quest a carrier (and now self-insured political subdivisions) to formally
admit, by request for admissions,34 7 that whatever compensation is due to
be paid to the worker should be paid in a lump sum because otherwise
manifest hardship would result. In Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Lee34 8
the court held that such a request was not a "fact" properly within the
scope of rule 169.1'9 This holding should not curtail the continued prac-
341. The Marsh opinion was cited and relied upon by the Eastland court in Texas Gen.
Indem. Co. v. Lee, 570 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.). The
facts in Lee were a mirror image of Marsh insofar as the jury's failure to answer the partial
incapacity issues was concerned. The Eastland court, following Marsh, and relying upon
the partial cannot exist at the same time as total instruction, held that the verdict was not
incomplete.
342. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Henson, 569 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Tex. Civ. App. -
Beaumont 1978, no writ).
343. Id
344. C.E. Duke's Wrecker Serv. Inc. v. Oakley, 526 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App. -Hous-
ton [lst Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
345. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 15 (Vernon 1967).
346. The Board routinely approves lump sum settlements and routinely orders compen-
sation paid in a lump sum whenever a final award is entered. Most district courts also
routinely approve lump sum settlements. This liberal lump sum settlement policy is one of
the reasons cited by Justice Keith as influencing a worker to pursue a Texas worker compen-
sation claim rather than a longshoremen harbor worker claim. See quotation and text ac-
companying note 325 supra.
347. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
348. 570 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
349. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
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tice of requesting carriers or self-insureds to admit manifest hardship,
however, because the Lee holding is simply that it was error for the trial
court to deem an unanswered hardship request for admission admitted. If
a carrier or self-insured employer desires to reduce the issues to be tried to
a minimum, they may still admit that hardship will occur and thereby
eliminate lump sum payment as a special issue to be submitted to the jury.
Evidence-First Report of Injury-Formal Statement of Position. Section
7 of article 8307350 requires the employer to file with the Board a first
report of injury35l ' anytime an employee is injured and is caused to be
absent from work for one full day. This report is normally filled out by the
employer's personnel and sometimes contains legal conclusions regarding
the status of a particular person as an employee or independent contractor
as well as other erroneous information. Naturally, if a carrier attempts to
take a position contrary to a "fact" contained in the employer's first report,
the claimant's attorney would attempt to impeach this contrary position by
introducing the employer's report. It must be remembered, however, that
the legislature has specifically declared that the employer's first report shall
not be deemed as "admissions and evidence" against the employer or car-
rier in any proceedings before the Board or elsewhere.352 Despite this
clear, unequivocal legislative mandate, the trial court in Texas Employers'
Insurance Association v. Henson35 3 allowed the claimant's attorney to read
into evidence against the carrier a portion of the employer's first report of
injury. The Beaumont court had no difficulty finding the trial court to be
in error in allowing the statement into evidence in violation of the statute,
reversing and remanding the case for new trial.354
The carrier's formal statement of position required355 to be filed with the
Industrial Accident Board differs considerably from the employer's first
report of injury. In the formal statement the carrier is required to respond
to the pre-hearing officer's recommendations by formally setting forth its
factual and legal position.356 Assertions made in the formal statement of
350. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 7 (Vernon 1967).
351. This report is normally made on a Board approved form referred to as the "E- ."
352. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 5 (Vernon 1967). The statute reads as fol-
lows:
The reports of accidents required by this law to be made by subscribers
shall not be deemed as admissions and evidence against the association or the
subscriber in any proceedings before the board or elsewhere in a contested
case where the facts set out therein or in any one of them is sought to be
contradicted by the association or subscriber.
Id
353. 569 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
354. The trial court not only ignored the plain provisions of the statute but hornbook
evidence law as well. The statement admitted into evidence was a statement by the em-
ployer, not the carrier. The employer is not a party to the suit and, therefore, any oral or
wntten statement by the employer would be inadmissible hearsay as far as the carrier is
concerned. Such a statement would not be an admission of a party because again the em-
ployer is not a party to the suit. See 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 1121 (2d ed. 1956).
355. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
356. Id
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position contrary to that asserted at trial are admissible as admissions
against interest if properly proven.357 It is the "properly proven" that de-
feated the claimant in Guzman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 358 In that
case the claimant sought to introduce the carrier's formal statement of po-
sition, which was filed with the Board on the carrier's letterhead of station-
ery, because in it the carrier admitted that the claimant was the insured's
employee. This was contrary to the carrier's trial position wherein it as-
serted that the claimant was an independent contractor.
The court of civil appeals recognized that the statement normally would
be admissible, if properly authenticated as being a statement made by the
carrier's authorized representative or agent. The court held, however, that
there was no evidence that the statement had been written by someone
authorized to make admissions binding on the carrier. Accordingly, the
court held that the trial court properly excluded the carrier's written state-
ment from evidence.
Sufficiency of Evidence on Appeal. A Texas court once aptly observed that
it is impossible "to reconcile all of the decisions of the Courts of Civil
Appeals passing upon the sufficiency and great weight questions arising as
to total and permanent disability findings in compensation cases." '359 Re-
viewing just a handful of the numerous factual insufficiency opinions rein-
forces the fear that, like equity, law is being dispensed according to the
length of the judge's foot.3  This is a sad commentary on the courts' in-
ability to provide a predictable standard by which either party may be able
to measure the strength or weakness of the evidence as against the jury's
result and advise the client accordingly. In most areas of law predictability
of result may well be a will-o'-the-wisp. Compensation cases, however, are
factually the same; only the parties' names change occasionally. Thus, a
relative degree of predictability could be obtained. Rather than predict-
ability, however, what Texas has achieved is a crazy patchwork quilt of
affirmances or reversals on a seemingly random basis. The only predict-
able factor common to any of these factual insufficiency opinions is the
357. See Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Scott, 152 Tex. I, 253 S.W.2d 651 (1952); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Adams, 555 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref d
n.r.e); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Adams, 488 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Beseda, 443 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1969, writ ref d n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Weber, 386 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ refd n.r.e.); Liberty Universal Ins. Co. v. Burrell, 386 S.W.2d
323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1965, writ refd n.r.e.).
358. 564 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
359. Transport Ins. Co. v. Kennon, 485 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1972, writ refd n.r.e.).
360. Equity is a roguish thing. For Law we have a measure, know what to trust to;
Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is
larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make the stan-
dard for the measure we call a 'foot' a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain
measure would this be! One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a
third an indifferent foot. 'Tis the same thing in the Chancellor's conscience.
J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 317 (14th ed. 1968) (quoting J. SELDEN, TABLE TALK(1689)).
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ultimate result that will be reached based upon the knowledge of the court
in which the case is pending. Unfortunately, a client's rights appear to boil
down to the client's luck in having the case decided in one court of civil
appeals rather than another. This survey year was no exception as a com-
parison of three opinions will illustrate.
The Houston [14th District] court affirmed a total permanent verdict 6 '
for a claimant who had sustained a neck injury while working as a pipefit-
ter. Despite the injury, he continued working at numerous jobs as a
pipefitter foreman and his income increased each year. In contrast, the El
Paso court reversed and remanded a total permanent verdict3 62 for a la-
borer who had sustained a back injury but subsequently obtained and re-
tained various jobs, including that of a truck driver, which was the job he
held at the time of trial. Finally, the Fort Worth court3 6 3 split over the
affirmance of a total permanent judgment, Chief Justice Massey writing a
strong dissent.364 In that case the claimant continued working for the same
employer for three and one-half years following the injury, doing the same
work and receiving periodic wage increases. Prior to trial the claimant
voluntarily obtained new employment paying a higher hourly wage.
If the escalation in the cost of insurance was not so serious, and if the
cases did not involve the lives of individual workers, a comparison of the
analysis applied in each of the foregoing cases would be humorous. For
example, the El Paso court relied upon several cases in support of its re-
mand that the Houston court expressly rejected because, "we disagree with
the holdings in those cases. '365 The majority of the Fort Worth court fell
back on the venerable but trite "our. . . compensation law should be lib-
erally construed in favor of Texas employees.' 366 Strange as it may seem,
this mandatory citation about liberal interpretation is absent from the El
Paso opinion as well as Judge Massey's dissent.36 7
361. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mariner, 567 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1978, no writ).
362. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ontiveros, 570 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1978, no writ).
363. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wilson, 563 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1978, no writ) (Massey, C.J., dissenting).
364. Id. at 690,
365. 567 S.W.2d at 70.
366. 563 S.W.2d at 688.
367. The "liberal construction" citation is often used by the courts to justify a multitude
of obviously gross statutory misconstructions of the compensation law. Most courts, how-
ever, misuse the liberal construction mandate because they have and do apply it not only to
a liberal statutory construction but a liberal attitude toward the interpretation of the evi-
dence and the "reasonable" inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In short, most courts
use "liberal construction" as a substitute for evidence of an injury and disability. On a prior
occasion, however, the supreme court has specifically held that even though the workmen's
compensation law is to be liberally construed, it does not follow that the rules of evidence
applicable in compensation cases are to be applied any differently than in any other case.
Truck Ins, Exch. v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1963):
In the first place, while the workmen's compensation law is to be liberally
construed and administered in favor of the employee, this does not mean that
the rules of evidence generally in the workmen's compensation case are to be
applied differently than they would be in cases arising under common law.
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The same luck of the draw involved in the review of a total permanent
verdict is, to a lesser extent, involved in a "no injury" or "injury but no
disability" verdict, as is illustrated by five opinions written during the last
survey year.368 The same is true of the verdicts involving limited, total and
limited or permanent, partial disability.3 69 One may dismiss the absurd
lack of rationality and consistency daily demonstrated by the factual insuf-
ficiency opinions raining down out of the various courts of civil appeals by
flippantly hoping to be "lucky" enough to draw a liberal or conservative
court in the next appeal or, for that matter, trial. Yet after explaining to
the client that all other things being equal, the result of the client's case
depends upon the philosophical attitude of the court he was lucky or un-
lucky enough to draw, an attorney must be prepared to answer the inevita-
ble question, "Why does the result of my case depend on luck?"
Id. at 173.
368. Abeyta v. Travelers Ins. Co., 566 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ
dism'd) (no injury verdict affirmed); Lewis v. Commercial Ins. Co., 566 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ) (injury but no disability verdict reversed and remanded for
new trial); Ramsey v. Sentry Ins., 564 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ)
injury but no disability verdict reversed and remanded for new trial); Fillyaw v. City of
eaumont, 564 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ) (no injury verdict
affirmed); Presley v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 557 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1977, no writ) (no injury verdict affirmed).
369. Wootan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 570 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus
Christi 1978, no writ) (temporary partial verdict affirmed); Burelsmith v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 568 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ) (limited temporary, total and
temporary, partial verdict affirmed); Fields v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 565 S.W.2d 327
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (limited temporary, total and temporary,
partial resulting from epididymitis and a subsequent epididymectomy affirmed); Whaley v.
Transport Ins. Co., 559 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ reftd n.r.e.) (limited
permanent partial loss of use of leg affirmed).
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